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"SUCCESS-AT LONG IAST": THE 
ABOliTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1928-1984 
ALAN ROGERS* 
Abstract: The national debate regarding the death penalty has raged 
for decades, consistently attracting a high degree of media, political, 
and legal attention. The effort to abolish the death penalty in 
Massachusetts was no different; the movement was a decades-long 
struggle that ensnared politicians, activists, falsely accused defendants, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court. This Article traces the contours of the 
anti-death penalty movement through the work of Sara Ehrmann, head 
of the Massachusetts Council Against the Death Penalty (MCADP), the 
numerous governors who had to confront this politically vexing issue, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court, which drove the final nail into the 
death penalty coffin in Massachusetts. This Article illustrates that the 
death penalty met its demise in Massachusetts because of tireless 
activists like Ehrmann, steadfast governors, and principled Supreme 
Judicial Court judges who used the law to invalidate the ultimate 
penalty. 
INTRODUCTION 
At a noon rally on May 10, 1947, Massachusetts Governor Robert 
F. Bradford, who had vaulted into the governor's office after winning 
a national reputation as a tough-on-crime Middlesex County district 
attorney, told a cheering crowd on Boston Common that providing 
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nia, Santa Barbara. He is the author of articles published in the American Journal of Legal 
Histary, Massachusetts Legal Histary, and the SuffolR University Law Review, among others. He 
would like to thank Professor Phyllis Goldfarb for inviting him to make a presentation at 
the Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation conference, held at Boston College in 
2001. This Article is part of a work in progress on the history of capital punishment in 
Massachusetts from 1630 to the present. Among other sources, the author used the Sara 
Ehrmann collection archived at Northeastern University's Snell Library. Newspaper ac-
counts cited in this article may be found throughout the collection and, therefore, do not 
always conform to A Uniform System of Citation. The quotation in the title is from a postcard 
sent to MCADP members following the passage of the mercy law on April 3, 1951. MCAPD 
leaflet, Box 36, Folder 11, Ehrmann Papers, infra note 9. 
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subsidies for veterans' housing was his top priority. Later in the day, 
the Governor spoke to reporters about his proposed sales tax. Neither 
Bradford nor the reporters following the Governor that late spring 
day said anything about the executions of Philip Bellino and Edward 
Gertson. The two men had been electrocuted at the Massachusetts 
State Prison shortly after midnight for the murder of nineteen-year-
old Robert ''Tex'' Williams, a former United States Marine'! 
In a little more than two decades, the public lost the callous in-
difference manifested by the public silence following Bellino and 
Gertson's executions. A loud and vigorous debate about capital pun-
ishment eventually led to a temporary national halt in executions and 
to the death penalty's abolition in Massachusetts. Bellino and Gertson 
were two of 153 persons executed in the United States in 19472 and 
the sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth-and last-persons to be executed in 
Massachusetts.3 Although the signs of change were not then apparent, 
Bellino and Gertson's executions came on the cusp of a social and 
legal transformation of attitudes and practices regarding the death 
penalty, a cause which Massachusetts abolitionists had been working 
on for two decades. During the 1950s the number of executions be-
gan to decline throughout the United States, falling steadily until they 
were stopped altogether from 1968 through 1977.4 Among other fac-
tors leading to this moratorium, between 1961 and 1969, the United 
States Supreme Court applied virtually all the procedural guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights to the states' administration of criminal justice. 
Capital defendants' increasing access to post-conviction review by fed-
eral courts accelerated the downward spiral of executions. This 
downward spiralled to the Supreme Court's 1972 decision Furman v. 
1 BoSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1947; BOSTON HERALD, May 10, 1947. For a brief sketch of 
Governor Bradford, a descendant of William Bradford, second governor of the Plymouth 
colony over three centuries earlier, see ALEC BARBROOK, GOD SAVE THE COMMONWEALTH: 
AN ELECTORAL HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS 55-56, 86 (1973). Bradford served as Lieu-
tenant Governor under Governor Maurice Tobin, 1944-1946. BOSTON HERALD, May 10, 
1947. 
2 WILLIAM J. BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE, DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
1864-1982, at 26 (1984). 
3 See id. at 46; WILLIAM F. BUGDEN, MAss. DEPT. OF CORR., AN ANALYSIS OF CONVIC-
TIONS OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE IN MASSACHUSETTS, FROM JANUARY 1, 1900 TO 
DECEMBER 31, 1962, at 2-3 (1963). 
4 See ROBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1972-1994, at 12, 21, 40 (1996). 
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Georgia, which held that capital punishment as then practiced was un-
constitutional.5 
The Court's per curiam opinion in Furman summarily reversed 
the death sentences, but not the convictions, of 118 prisoners on 
death row. By the time state courts applied the decision to all death 
sentenced prisoners not mentioned in the per curiam holding, the 
number of death sentences vacated rose to 631. Massachusetts, for 
example, commuted the sentences of twenty-two men from death to 
life imprisonment.6 Justice Stewart, in dicta in his concurring opinion 
in Furman, suggested that Massachusetts' mandatory death penalty 
for felony murder-rape might satisfy constitutional requirements. At 
the time two men-both African-Americans-were under death sen-
tences for that crime. Although hailed by optimistic abolitionists, 
Furman did not signify the end of executions in the United States. 
Many state legislatures, including the Massachusetts Great and Gen-
eral Court, immediately set to work to repair the procedural flaws in 
death penalty statutes that the Court identified. Four years later, in 
Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
reformed capital punishment statutes.7 The Court's decision did not 
5 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972); BOWERS, supra note 2, at 46; 
HAINES, supra note 4, at 12, 21, 40. An enormous amount has been written about the death 
penalty in America, and the following brief list is suggestive rather than exhaustive. See 
grmerally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: THE INEVITABIUTY OF CAPRICE 
AND MISTAKE (1974); BOWERS, supra note 2; HAINES, supra note 4; WELSH S. WHITE, THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES (1991); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam 
Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982). 
6 Furman, 408 U.S. at 329-30; Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public opinion and the 
Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245, 1245 (1974). Following the per curiam statement in 
Furman, there were nine separate opinions, comprising 243 pages, the longest in Court 
history. The four dissenters were more uniform in their critiques than the majority. All of 
the dissenters expressed the view that the Court was treading on legislative turf and that 
Americans had not regulated the death penalty. Chief Justice Burger's opinion raised the 
possibility that states might rewrite their death statutes to meet the Court's objectives. 
7 See 428 U.S. 153, 153-54 (1976). In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) andJurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), a plurality of the Court rejected the abolitionists' argument 
that capital punishment per se was unconstitutional and mandated bifurcated proceedings 
and guided discretion standards for sentences and appellate review. However, the Court 
invalidated North Carolina's death penalty statute which imposed a mandatory death sen-
tence for certain crimes in a companion case to Gregg, Woodson v. North Carolina. See 428 
U.S. 280, 301 (1976). The Court found that "North Carolina's mandatory death penalty 
statute for first-degree murder departs markedly from contemporary standards respecting 
the imposition of the punishment of death and thus cannot be applied consistently with 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirement that the State's power to punish 'be 
exercised within the limits of civilized standards.'" Id. Further, in the final Gregg compan-
ion case, Roberts "II. Louisiana, the Court invalidated Louisiana's statute despite the fact that 
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affect Massachusetts, however, because Governor Francis W. Sargent 
and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) blocked the legislature's effort 
to reinstate mandatory death sentencing for all first-degree murder 
convictions. Both Sargent's 1973 veto of the legislature's bill and the 
SJC's decision in Commonwealth v. O'Nea4 holding that the right to life 
is a constitutionally protected right which triggers strict scrutiny un-
der the compelling state interest test, shielded Massachusetts from 
Greggs impact.8 
Although there is an enormous quantity of historical and legal 
literature highlighting the arguments and issues swirling around capi-
tal punishment, the story of the long and ultimately successful mod-
ern abolition campaign within Massachusetts has not been told. This 
Article uncovers the neglected history of the campaign to ~nd the 
death penalty beginning in 1928 and culminating in 1984 with its abo-
lition by the SJC. Massachusetts has been the only state to abolish the 
death penalty by judicial interpretation of its state constitution. There 
were three major phases in the Massachusetts campaign. Although 
these phases were not intentionally integrated, they overlapped con-
siderably; the momentum created by the success of one phase allowed 
other steps to follow somewhat more easily. 
Part I of this Article discusses the first phase, which began in 1928 
with the long, complicated, and often confusing murder trials of 
Gangi Cero and Samuel Gallo and concluded with the passage of an 
alternative sentencing law in 1951. The Massachusetts Council Against 
the Death Penalty (MCADP), led for four decades by Sara Ehrmann, 
was instrumental in this first phase of the campaign. 
The second phase of the campaign, detailed in Part II, featured 
elected state officials as well as citizen groups who between 1949 and 
1975 took a firm public stand against the death penalty in the face of 
rising crime rates. The final phase of the campaign, outlined in Part 
III of this Article, featured the SJC as the major player. After 1969, a 
handful of defense attorneys and SJC Justices G. Joseph Tauro, Ed-
ward F. Hennessey, and Paul J. Liacos, used the Massachusetts Decla-
ration of Rights to articulate a constitutional argument that abolished 
the state's mandatory death sentence provision applied to a narrower range of defendants 
than the statute in Woodson. 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). 
8 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153-54 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. at 307-08 (Stewart,]., concur-
ring); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 1975) (O'Neall). In Comrrwn-
wealth v. LeBlanc, the SJC declared that all pre-Furman death sentences must be vacated. 
299 N.E.2d 719, 726-27 (Mass. 1973). For Sargent's veto message, see BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
10,1973. 
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the death penalty. This Article explores the historical roots of that ex-
traordinary legal change.9 
I. THE FIRST PHASE: FROM OBSCURITY IN 1928 TO PARTIAL 
VICTORY IN 1951 
The Massachusetts Council Against the Death Penalty (MCADP) , 
the only active state organization dedicated to abolition from 1928 
through 1950, was founded in the aftermath of Sacco and Vanzetti's 
executions.lO The MCADP, which had a grudging paper relationship 
with the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment (ALACP) , 
acted independently from that New York-based national organization, 
distinguishing itself from the left-wing politics that drove both the 
ALACP and the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee.ll Directed ini-
tially by a Quaker activist, in 1928 the MCADP turned to Sara Rosen-
feld Ehrmann, a thirty-three-year-old Brookline housewife and 
mother of two young children, whose husband Herbert had been on 
the Sacco-Vanzetti defense team. 
9 See generally Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); O'Neal I, 
327 N.E.2d 662; Commonwealth v. Gallo, 175 N.E. 718 (Mass. 1931); Commonwealth v. 
Cero, 162 N.E. 349 (Mass. 1928). The Commonwealth is currently one of a dozen states 
(plus the District of Columbia) without capital punishment. The Northeastern University 
Library Archives are home to Sara R. Ehrmann's manuscript collection that includes the 
activities of the MCADP as well as materials covering the death penalty movement in Mas-
sachusetts. Throughout this article, citation to materials housed in the Northeastern Ar-
chives in Boston, Massachusetts will conform to the citation format suggested by the ar-
chives. Papers, 1845-1993, Sara R. Ehrmann (M39) University Libraries, Archives and 
Special Collections Department, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts [hereinaf-
ter Ehrmann Papers]. Alternative sentencing, or the mercy law, allowed a jury to make a 
binding recommendation to a court that a defendant found guilty of first-degree murder 
be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than to death. For the mercy law, see 1951 Mass. 
Acts 203 (currently codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 265, § 2 (2000». For information 
regarding different states' treatment of the death penalty, see THE DEATII PENALTY IN 
AMERICAN CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 9 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). 
10 The Sacco-Vanzetti case began in 1921 as a simple trial for murder-robbery. It ended 
six years later as an international cause in which many people believed that Massachusetts 
had executed two innocent men because they held radical views. See generally FRANCIS Rus-
SELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM (1962). 
11 For the relationship between the ALACP and the MCADP, see Letter from Vivian 
Pierce to Glendower Evans, Sept. 29, 1927, Box 17, Folder 18, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 
9. The ALACP began in 1925 and included among its founders Clarence Darrow. Vivian 
Pierce served as ALACP's Executive Secretary until the group's collapse and absorption by 
the MCADP in 1949. The mercy bill was a staple of the MCADP's campaign against capital 
punishment and was introduced each year from 1928 to 1951. When the ALACP collapsed, 
its papers were transferred to the MCADP and are now included in the Ehrmann Papers. 
Boxes 32-33, All Folders, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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A. The Sara Ehrmann Story 
Sara Ehrmann was born in Bowling Green, Kentucky in 1895 to 
parents Abram and Helen. The family moved to Rochester. New York 
when Sara was three years old. Because Abram was a liquor salesman 
who spent a great deal of time on the road, Sara's mother assumed 
major responsibility for raising Sara and her two brothers. Helen 
taught the children the fundamentals of Judaism, but she also en-
couraged a belief in a home-spun universal religion, in pacifism, and 
in the Democratic politics of William Jennings Bryant. Sara enrolled 
at the University of Rochester in 1912. While in Rochester, Sara pre-
pared herself for a career as a reform worker, drawing political inspi-
ration from her mother as well as from professor and, later, Democrat 
Congressman Meyer Jacobstein.12 
The summer following her freshman year, Sara joined her family 
on their annual visit to their Kentucky relatives. At her cousin's home, 
Sara met young Herbert Ehrmann, who had just completed his first 
year at Harvard Law School. They talked and went on a hayride with 
friends, but they made no plans to meet again. At the end of the 
summer, when Sara returned to Rochester, she temporarily left her 
college studies to work for the women's suffrage movement. She loved 
the work, especially her first job chauffeuring Eleanor Garrison, a 
prominent Massachusetts suffragist, on a speaking tour of New York 
State. At each stop Ehrmann, a petite, brown-eyed teenager, jumped 
on the hood of the car shouting, trying to attract attention, and trad-
ing barbs with hecklers until a crowd gathered. I ''was never a rebel," 
she later recalled, but thought it only "fair and right" that women 
should vote. As this comment suggests, Ehrmann was-and re-
mained-a "social feminist," a term historian William O'Neill coined 
to describe women whose primary concern was service to others and 
to society, as contrasted with feminists whose goal was the achieve-
ment of individual opportunities.13 
12 William Ewing was the first executive director of MCADP. See generally Michael Suss-
man, The Movement Against Capital Punishment in Massachusetts: Origins and Lesson, 
Box 37, Folders 27-28, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. Details about Sara Ehrmann's early 
life are drawn largely from drafts of an unpublished biography by Michael Sussman. See 
generally id. Jacobstein served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1923-1929. This 
Article focuses only on Ehrmann's activity with MCADP, but she also served in dozens of 
volunteer groups including the League of Women Voters, Women's City Club, United 
Prison Association, Norfolk Lifer's Group, and the American Jewish Committee. See gener-
ally Boxes 32-37, All Folders, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
13 See generally WIllIAM L. O'NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: A HISTORY OF FEMINISM IN 
AMERICA 142-43 (1969); Sussman, supra note 12. 
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On a fall 1914 visit with friends at Wellesley College, Herbert and 
Sara met again. For the next three years, Sara and Herbert shuttled 
back and forth between Rochester and Boston where Herbert worked 
as a Legal Aid lawyer. They were married in Rochester in 1917 shortly 
after Sara graduated from the University of Rochester and just about a 
month after the United States entered World War I. Sara gave birth to 
Bruce, their first son, in Boston the following June. A few months 
later, Herbert left for Washington, D.C. to accept a position as staff 
attorney with the Government Shipping Board. The war ended by the 
time Sara and Bruce moved to a rented farmhouse in North Chevy 
Chase, Maryland to be with Herbert. Rather than returning directly to 
Boston, the Ehrmanns moved to Ohio, where Herbert became part of 
a team of young progressive lawyers recruited by Harvard Law School 
professor Felix Frankfurter to study Cleveland's criminal justice sys-
tem. The team shared the belief that urban crime might be amelio-
rated through improved training oflocal police, more efficient courts, 
and the elimination of political corruption. Their work resulted in a 
landmark study, Criminal Justice in Cleveland.14 
Sara welcomed the temporary move to Cleveland. Like many col-
lege-educated young women of her generation, Sara found the 
housewife's traditional role unfulfilling. As a result, she seized the op-
portunity to help compile the Cleveland criminal justice data. Upon 
moving back to Boston, Sara took courses at Radcliffe College, volun-
teered at an immigrant aid agency, and put her new research skills to 
good use. Herbert, who was working pro bono with Sacco-Vanzetti's 
appellate attorney William Thompson, became convinced that a 
Providence, Rhode Island gang was responsible for the robbery and 
murders for which Sacco and Vanzetti were convicted. Sara unearthed 
data from federal court records to bolster Herbert's theory. Of 
course, neither Herbert Ehrmann's alternate scenario or defense mo-
tions raising serious due process questions stopped the executions of 
Sacco and Vanzetti on August 23, 1927.15 Many years later, Sara pri-
vately commented: 
14 Seegmerally HERBERT B. EHRMANN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL COURTS (1922), reprinted in 
CLEVELAND FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND; REpORTS OF THE CLEVELAND 
FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 
(Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1968); Sussman, supra note 12. 
15 See generally HERBERT B. EHRMANN, THE CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE: COMMON-
WEALTH V. SACCO AND VANZETTI (1969). For the "subversive influence [of college educa-
tion] upon the traditional conception of women and the family," see CARL N. DEGLER, AT 
ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 314 
(1980). 
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I saw the details of the Sacco-Vanzetti case close up, includ-
ing the judicial hesitancy to explore exculpatory routes, the 
media's hysteria, the emotional outcry for their lives. I knew 
there was something wrong with the death penalty because 
there were too many questions unresolved when the men 
were executed. Their deaths signified a finality inappropri-
ate in terms of the finality one could feel with respect to the 
evidence. I6 
B. Ehrmann and MCADP: The Beginnings of a Strategy 
Sara Ehrmann's public silence about Sacco-Vanzetti, her proven 
legal research skills, and her commitment to social reform led Har-
vard Law School professor and MCADP board member Zechariah 
Chafee to offer Ehrmann the position of executive director of 
MCADP. In 1928, Ehrmann accepted and agreed to a salary of $1200 
per year, a contractual arrangement that "melted away" at the onset of 
the Great Depression. It is hard to imagine a more inauspicious time 
to assume a leadership role in an unpopular cause. In addition to 
Sacco-Vanzetti, a string of highly publicized murders captured na-
tional attention during the 1920s and 1930s and bolstered public 
support for the death penalty. Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb's 
"thrill murder" of young Bobby Franks, Al Capone's Chicago gang-
land killings, and the Lindbergh kidnap-murder, among other sensa-
tional homicides, led national magazines and newspapers to conclude 
that a "crime wave" was pounding the United States. 
Author Richard W. Child asserted in the Saturday Evening Post 
that an overly indulgent criminal justice system allowed most murder-
ers to escape punishment. In fact, the opposite seemed true. From 
1930 to 1940, states executed nearly 1800 death row inmates nation-
wide,17 including eighteen in Massachusetts. Is At no time during this 
gruesome decade did a significant number of the Massachusetts citi-
zens, the legislature, or the SJC speak out against capital punishment. 
Although death penalty opponents conducted vociferous public ral-
lies for some men condemned to death, the rallies were often sparsely 
attended. Likewise, until 1951 when Governor Paul Dever signed a 
mercy bill and set in motion a twenty-four year period in which the 
16 See generally Sussman, supra note 12. 
17 HAINES, supra note 4, at 12. 
18 See BOWERS, supra note 2, at 449. 
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death penalty was still legal but no prisoner was put to death,19 Massa-
chusetts' governors and the Executive Council supported the death 
penalty and routinely denied clemency appeals. The SJC rejected 
dozens of motions for new trials brought by men convicted of capital 
murder. Under Chief Justice Arthur P. Rugg, who came to the court in 
1906, moved to the center seat in 1911, and served until 1938, Massa-
chusetts' criminal due process changed very little from nineteenth 
century practice. The court offered the accused little protection and a 
bare handful of options for post-conviction appeals. During Rugg's 
long tenure, the SJC reversed only two capital convictions, and on re-
trial both of those men were found guilty and subsequently exe-
cuted.2o 
While lawyers hammered at the court's constricted view of crimi-
nal due process, the MCADP forged a three-pronged strategy to over-
come legislative support for capital punishment. First, rather than 
campaign around an abstract-for or against capital punishment-
referendum question as advised by the ALACP, Ehrmann focused on 
the Massachusetts legislature. Ehrmann inundated legislators with 
data about capital punishment and sought to make it as easy as 
possible for lawmakers to embrace some manifestation of opposition 
to the death penalty. Specifically, she and others she recruited 
appeared each year before the Joint House-Senate Judiciary 
Committee. These annual appeals urged lawmakers to enact a bill 
abolishing the death penalty, a law permitting jurors to recommend 
19 See Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (Mass. 1980). 
20 For Ehrmann's salary, see BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 1963 and Letter from Sara Ehr-
mann to Raymond S. Rubinow, Dec. 22,1955, Box 34, Folder 34, Ehrmann Papers, supra 
note 9. In fact, Ehrmann never received a salary but relied upon donations to keep the 
organization afloat. Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Honorable William Rantsdell, Mar. 22, 
1945, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For the highly publicized murder cases, see ATTOR-
NEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN THE COURTROOM 16-88 (Arthur Weinberg 
ed., 1989). See grmeralryEHRMANN, supra note 15;JIM FISHER, THE LINDBERGH CASE (1987); 
FRANCIS RUSSELL, "IRAGEDY IN DEDHAM (2d ed., 1971). In the wake of the Lindbergh kid-
napping, Sara Ehrmann opposed a Massachusetts bill to make kidnapping a capital crime. 
See Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Editor, WORCESTER POST, Mar. 21,1932; SATURDAY EVEN-
ING POST, Oct. 24, 1925; SATURDAY EVENING POST, Oct. 10, 1925; SATURDAY EVENING 
POST, Sept. 26,1925; SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept. 12, 1925; SATURDAY EVENING POST, 
Aug. 29, 1925; SATURDAY EVENING POST, Aug. 15, 1925; SATURDAY EVENING POST, Aug. 1, 
1925. For the best source for homicide data, see generally H.C. BREARLEY, HOMICIDE IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1932). With Sara Ehrmann's direct influence, Governor Joseph B. 
Ely (1930-1934) introduced a capital punishment study bill in 1931 and a bill to re-define 
first degree murder to except homicide motivated primarily by emotion in 1934. At the 
same time, Ely signed death warrants ordering the execution of seven convicted murder-
ers. See BOWERS, supra note 2, at 449. 
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a law permitting jurors to recommend mercy, and a resolution estab-
lishing a commission to study capital punishment. 
The second prong of the MCADP's strategy focused on specific 
capital cases to illustrate to legislators and to fix public attention on 
the glaring imperfections of murder investigations and capital proce-
dure. Of course, Ehrmann also wanted to bring as many people as 
possible into the abolition campaign, but she was interested chiefly in 
recruiting political, religious, and civic leaders, men and women 
whose names flanked the MCADP's letterhead. Third, Ehrmann 
brought pressure to bear on sitting governors not to sign execution 
orders. 
The MCADP left efforts to change capital procedure to the law-
yers. Working separately from Ehrmann, Zechariah Chafee and a 
handful of attorneys repeatedly asked the Boston Bar Association to 
study the question of capital punishment. He and Francis Russell, who 
was working on a book about Sacco-Vanzetti, also urged the Judicial 
Council-an appointed advisory group-to recommend to the legisla-
ture a law permitting the SJC to review matters of fact as well as ques-
tions of law as part of a capital appeal. 21 
l. The First Prong: Persuading the Legislature 
With a burst of energy she sustained for almost four decades, 
Ehrmann plunged into her work in 1928. Her long campaign against 
capital punishment began with the simple act of hosting a public din-
ner-speech by E. Roy Calvert, an English criminologist and author. 
Calvert told his Boston listeners that the "problem of capital punish-
ment must be approached in a scientific manner unbiased by any sen-
timental reasoning." He produced data that showed the death penalty 
was not a deterrent to homicide. Meeting privately with Ehrmann, 
21 Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Glendower Evans, Feb. 12, 1931, Box 17, Folder 18, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Glendower Evans to Vivian Pierce, Sept. 29, 
1927, Box 17, Folder 18, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. Sara Ehrmann advocated for a 
study of capital punishment, but opposed a popular referendum. Letter fi'om Sara Ehr-
mann to Editor Klaus, BOSTON TRANSCRIPT, Feb. 16, 1932, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
For information on recommendations to the Judicial Council, see Letter from Francis 
Russell to Governor Saltonstall, Dec. 21, 1938, Box 19, Folder 24, Ehrmann Papers, supra 
note 9. The legislature formed the Judicial Council in 1924. It was composed of represen-
tatives, one each nominated by the Chief Justice of the SJC, the Chief Justice of the Supe-
rior Court, one judge of the land court, one judge of a probate court, one judge of a dis-
trict court, and not more than four members of the bar appointed by the governor. The 
appointments were not to exceed four years. Third Report of the Judicial Council, reprinted in 
13 MAss. L. Q. 7,37-43 (1927). 
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Calvert suggested effective ways to administer the campaign. A short 
time after Calvert's appearance, Ehrmann issued a press release not-
ing that Republican State Senator Angier Goodwin's bill to abolish 
the death penalty had the support of a number of locally prominent 
people. 
Next, Ehrmann and a small, energetic band of young MCADP 
members spoke face-to-face with each member of the Judiciary Com-
mittee. Every legislator received a flyer listing ten reasons for abolish-
ing capital punishment that had the personal endorsement of the 
current Massachusetts Commissioner of Corrections, Dr. Warren A. 
Stearns. Stearns stated, "I am unalterably opposed to capital punish-
ment. It does more harm than good." About a month later, Ehrmann 
and a dozen other opponents of capital punishment testified before 
the Judiciary Committee in favor of Goodwin's bill. She stressed two 
arguments. One, society may feel safe sentencing murderers to life 
imprisonment. 'There is no danger that Life Prisoners are wantonly 
pardoned," or that those few who are pardoned will murder again. 
For emphasis Ehrmann added that "no life prisoner has ever mur-
dered a guard in Massachusetts," and "no life prisoner had ever es-
caped." Second, she pointed out that those states and countries that 
had abolished capital punishment had lower homicide rates.22 
Suffolk Law School Dean Gleason Archer bluntly spoke for pro-
ponents of the death penalty. Without the death penalty, Archer con-
tended, the "criminal element" would seize control of society. To sup-
port this frightening assertion, he cited the general chaos-though 
there were no reported homicides-accompanying the 1919 Boston 
police strike. Life imprisonment was not an acceptable alternative be-
cause imprisonment did not crush the killer's spirit. "Lifers are rosy 
with the hope" they might be paroled or pardoned, Archer claimed. 
They were also likely to escape and become "beasts of prey" again. 
Executing a murderer rid the world of a "human mad-dog," Archer 
told the legislators. In 1931, the Judiciary Committee rejected Good-
22 For information on Calvert's visit to Boston, see BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 29, 1929 and 
Sussman, supra note 12. Ehrmann's press release was sent to Boston newspapers on Janu-
ary 8,1930, and included the leaflet sent to legislators of which Dr. Stearns' statement was 
a part. Leaflet, Box 36, Folder 11, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For reports on Ehr-
mann's desire to drive out the "old people," see Letter from Miriam Van Waters to Vivian 
Pierce, May 10, 1939, Box 19, Folder 71, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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win's abolition bill eleven to five, a margin that remained unchanged 
for the next decade.23 
2. The Second Prong: Using Cases to Highlight the Death Penalty's 
Fallibility 
In addition to articulating the arguments against capital punish-
ment to the legislature, Ehrmann focused on a controversial murder 
case, the first in a long string of accused and convicted murderers she 
sought to save from death. The case against Gangi Cero seemed 
slight, but before justice had run its course, Cero was tried twice for 
murder and came within hours of being executed for a crime he did 
not commit. For many years afterwards, Ehrmann would cite the Cero 
case as evidence of a flawed criminal justice system and to argue that 
capital punishment should be abolished lest the State execute the 
wrong person.24 
On June 11, 1927, Joseph Fantasia was shot in the back at close 
range as he walked along a crowded street in Boston's North End. 
Guided by two eyewitnesses, the police arrested Cero, a Brooklyn, 
New York native who six weeks earlier had moved to Boston to work 
for Samuel Gallo, a clothing salesman. At trial, an eyewitness testified 
that he saw Cero drop "something" as he ran from the murder scene. 
Another witness stated that he saw an unidentified man fire the fatal 
shot, toss away the revolver, and slowly walk away from the chaotic 
scene. Under oath, Cero denied murdering Fantasia and claimed that 
he had accidentally dropped nothing more sinister than his hat as he 
pushed his way through the panic-stricken crowd. Despite Cero's 
statement and other contradictory evidence, the jury found Cero 
guilty of first-degree murder on November 17, 1927. Judge Louis S. 
Cox denied three defense motions for a new trial. Cero appealed the 
rulings.25 
William R. Scharton, one of the best criminal lawyers in Boston, 
represented Cero before the SJC. In the spring of 1928, Schart~n ar-
23 For Archer's argument, see National Civic Federation,Jan. 15, 1931, Box 36, Folder 
35, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
24 Among other reasons for abolishing capital punishment listed in MCADP leaflets, 
was the possibility of an "irrevocable miscarriage of justice." MCADP Leaflets, 1931, 1934, 
1936, Box 36, Folder 11, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. Gangi Cero's case was the accom-
panying example. [d. Zechariah Chafee also testified, arguing that juries had difficulty 
determining the dividing line between the several degrees of murder. [d. 
25 Commonwealth v. Cem, 162 N.E. 349, 350, 351 (Mass. 1928); BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
16,1927. 
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gued, as he had before trial began, that the entire jury empanelled to 
hear Cero's case was tainted. Scharton explained that police officers 
had interviewed potential jurors listed for the November 1927 sitting 
of the criminal court and forwarded the results to the Suffolk County 
district attorney. At trial, Judge Cox had refused to allow Cero to ask 
each potential juror about police questioning. The judge ruled that 
potential jurors were to be asked only the statutory questions during 
voir dire. 26 
Justice Edward P. Pierce, appointed to the SJC in 1914, spoke for 
a unanimous court in rejecting the defendant's appeal for a more far-
ranging round of questions during voir dire. "There is not a word, not 
a phrase, in the statement of counsel for the defendant, which, if 
proved, would have the slightest evidential value in establishing that 
the list of jurors was not prepared according to law or that the jurors 
were not legally drawn," wrote Pierce, gruffly missing the point.27 
Further, Pierce found nothing improper with the questionnaire that 
the police required potential jurors to complete. The questionnaire 
asked potential jurors and their family members about their "life 
style," their "politics," their "affiliations," and if they were related to 
any "former Boston officer" who had abandoned duty during the 
1919 police strike,28 among other questions. But, because the ques-
tionnaire "was prepared ... for general use ... [and] was not directed 
to the case at bar," Pierce was "unable to see how such an investiga-
tion, properly conducted, can be interpreted, as the defendant con-
tends, to be an 'attempt to influence the jurors in favor of the com-
26 Statutory questions asked jurors during voir dire include the following: Was the ju-
ror related to the prisoner or to the deceased? Did the potential juror have any interest in 
the case? Was he conscious of any bias about the case? Did the potential juror hold an 
opinion that would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty of an offense punish-
able by death if the evidence satisfied him beyond a reasonable doubt? Scharton estab-
lished that police officers who questioned potential Suffolk County jurors were following 
orders issued by Boston Police Commissioner Herbert Wilson, but Scharton was not able 
to convince Judge Cox that he should be permitted to question jurors about the police 
visit. Motion for New Trial at 10-18, 20-34, 115-16, Commonwealth v. Cero, 162 N.E. 349 
(Mass. 1927) (on file at Massachusetts SJC Archives) . 
27 Cero, 162 N.E. at 351. 
28 Organized by the American Federation of Labor in the wake of World War I, more 
than 900 Boston policemen struck for higher wages and improved working conditions on 
September 9, 1919. Governor Calvin Coolidge called out the National Guard to restore 
order. Not a single one of the striking policemen was ever rehired by the City of Boston. 
THOMAS H. O'CONNOR, THE BOSTON IRISH 191-93 (1995). 
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monwealth.' "29 Pierce concluded that Cero had an impartial and in-
differen t jury. 30 
Having brushed aside Cero's constitutional challenges, Pierce 
also upheld Judge Cox's denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial on the basis of recently discovered evidence. Specifically, the SJC 
ruled that Cox was not obligated to hear evidence that another per-
son had murdered Fantasia. Following the SJC's ruling, Judge Cox 
sentenced Cero to be executed during the week of November 4, 
1928.31 Authorities moved Cero into a death row cell at Charlestown 
prison.32 
About a month before Cero's scheduled execution, police ar-
rested Samuel Gallo, Cero's former employer, and charged him with 
contempt of court for offering a bribe to a crucial government witness 
if he would change his testimony about Cero. Gallo was found guilty 
and sentenced to two years at Charlestown, the same prison housing 
Cero. Gallo befriended Cero, providing him with money, cigarettes, 
and food. But on Columbus Day 1928, Cero plunged a kitchen knife 
into Gallo's chest as the two men walked in the prison exercise yard. 
Mter his violent act, Cero told prison authorities that if he was to die 
for murder, then Gallo should as well. Cero stopped short of pro-
claiming his own innocence or of accusing Gallo of murdering Fanta-
sia.33 
As his execution day drew closer, however, Cero had second 
thoughts about maintaining his silence. Just two days before his 
scheduled execution, his older brother Cosimo arrived at Char-
lestown prison from New York. Mter several hours of emotional con-
versation, Cosimo pried from his brother the names of several people 
who could save him. Cosimo bolted from the prison and ran through 
Boston's North End shouting, "Help me! Help me!" On the second 
day of his search, just nine hours before Cero was to be executed, Co-
simo met Phelomina Romano, a young woman who said she saw Gallo 
fire the shot that killed Fantasia. Cosimo grabbed Romano's hand and 
the two rushed through the North End's crowded streets to the Mas-
29 Cero, 162 N.E. at 353, 354. 
30 [d. at 351,353-54; 1887 Mass. Acts l491; Commonwealth v. Poisson, 32 N.E. 906, 907 
(Mass. 1893). 
31 BOSTON HERALD,Jan. 10, 1929. 
32 Cero, 162 N.E. at 354. A MCADP member told Ehrmann that Cero was offered a five-
year sentence if he would plead guilty to manslaughter, but he refused. Letter from Glen-
dower Evans to Sara Ehrmann, Jan. 30, 1931, Box 17, Folder 18, Ehrmann Papers, supra 
note 9. 
33 N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1931. 
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sachusetts statehouse where Governor Alvan Fuller sat in vigil, as he 
did prior to all executions. Mter hearing Romano's story shifting guilt 
from Cero to Gallo, the Governor brought Judge Cox into the discus-
sion. In addition to repeating her eyewitness account, Romano added 
details that supplied the missing motive for Fantasia's murder: She 
had been Gallo's mistress until she fell in love with Fantasia. To show 
his scorn for Gallo, Fantasia ordered Romano to slash Gallo's cheeks. 
It now seemed possible that Gallo murdered Fantasia in order to re-
venge the humiliation he had suffered at the hand of Fantasia. Fuller 
and Cox agreed that Cero's execution must be stopped. A grand jury 
returned a murder indictment against Gallo.34 
At this point the MCADP became directly involved in Cero's de-
fense. The group raised money to provide Cero with additional legal 
help and an investigator to aid in building a case against Gallo. The 
investigator's first job was to find Phelomina Romano who, since 
Gallo's arrest, had repudiated her statement exonerating Cero and 
then disappeared. At trial, Romano-who was found a few days before 
trial and held in the Charles Street jail-and Cero testified that Gallo 
murdered Fantasia. Gallo denounced Cero and Romano as liars and 
claimed he was in East Boston at the time of the murder. Mter about 
seven hours of deliberation, the jury announced that it had found 
Gallo guilty of murder in the first degree.35 
This finding meant two men, each alone and independently of 
the other, had been charged with the murder of the same man by 
separate indictments and had been separately convicted and sen-
tenced to death. Arguing that this bizarre result was untenable and 
unconscionable, Cero's counsel explored the possibility of a guberna-
torial pardon. He then filed a motion with Judge Cox, who had pre-
sided over both trials, to dismiss the guilty verdict against Cero. At 
that motion hearing late in March 1929, Ehrmann served as the 
MCADP's eyes and ears, and she found Judge Cox "exceedingly hos-
tile" and openly doubtful of Cero's innocence. In the witness box, 
Cero explained that he had initially not named Gallo as the murderer 
because, "I don't want to be a stool pigeon." When asked by Judge 
Cox to define the term, Cero said, "one who tells on another." 
Whether this convinced Cox or not, he did set aside both guilty ver-
dicts and ordered a new trial for Cero and Gallo. 36 
!4 BOSTON HERALD,Jan. 10, 1929; WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZE'ITE, Dec. 25, 1966. 
35 BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 1,1929. 
36 See generally Sussman, supra note 12. 
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While Cero's attorneys prepared for a fall trial, Ehrmann and 
Zechariah Chafee worked behind the scenes to have the district at-
torney drop the charge against Cero. In the summer of 1930, Ehr-
mann went to see Frank Brooks, Chairman of the Parole Board and a 
friend of Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney F. M. Sheehan, to 
urge Brooks to intervene on Cero's behalf. But Brooks refused, telling 
Ehrmann there was good reason-though no concrete evidence-to 
believe that Cero and Gallo were accomplices in the murder of Fanta-
sia. Dismayed, Ehrmann turned her attention to Cero, who once 
again resided on death row. In the month before the trial, Ehrmann 
visited Cero two or three times a week.37 
In the fall of 1930, the State tried Cero and Gallo together on the 
original separate murder indictments. This curious decision by the 
prosecution was one of several unusual procedures that distinguished 
their trials. The Commonwealth insisted that both men were guilty as 
charged, arguing that each man acted independently to produce a 
single criminal result, the murder of Fantasia. The State relied upon 
Cero's testimony-"a murderer and a confessed perjurer," as Gallo's 
defense counsel labeled him-to convict Gallo. However, the State 
failed to get Gallo to accuse Cero of murdering Fantasia because 
Gallo insisted that he was elsewhere at the time of the murder. 
Assistant District Attorney Sheehan suffered from another handi-
cap-the second disappearance of his star witness, Phelomina Romano. 
In her absence, Sheehan read from the transcript of her testimony at 
Cero's second trial in which she accused Gallo of murdering Fantasia. 
Given these obstacles, the Boston press saw it as a foregone conclu-
sion that Sheehan would fail to convict both Cero and Gallo. The 
MCADP was especially critical of Sheehan's closing argument. Cero's 
defense attorney, Thomas Breshahan, for example, claimed that 
Sheehan too often used language intended to prove conspiracy or 
joint motive rather than adhering to argument designed to show that 
each man acted separately to effect the murder of Fantasia. The jury 
managed to sort out the facts despite the confusing procedure: They 
acquitted Cero and found Gallo guilty of first-degree murder.38 
Cero returned to Italy a free man, and Gallo appealed his convic-
tion to the SJC. In the spring of 1931, Gallo argued that the trial court 
had erred in denying his two motions for a new trial. First, Gallo con-
37 See generally id. 
:IS Commonwealth v. Gallo, 175 N.E. 718, 719 (Mass. 1931); N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1931. 
See generally Sussman, supra note 12. 
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tended that the trial court's rejection of his motion for a separate trial 
violated his right to due process guaranteed by Article 12 of the Mas-
sachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U. S. Constitution. Second, Gallo argued that his trial violated the 
right to "to meet the witnesses against him face to face" because when 
Romano could not be found, the court allowed the district attorney to 
read from Romano's damning testimony given against him at a previ-
ous trial.39 
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Rugg rejected 
Gallo's bid for a new trial. In doing so Rugg revealed the SJC's general 
thoughts about criminal procedure as well as the court's specific view 
of the relationship between due process and justice. Rugg's formalist 
approach emphasized stare decisis and the discovery of underlying 
legal principles. He routinely deferred to the trial judge's discretion-
ary powers and rejected defense arguments he found contrary to "our 
system of criminal procedure as disclosed in the decisions of this 
court."4O He paid lip-service to social and political change, but he 
supported without question traditional law enforcement techniques 
and rules of evidence that placed a criminal defendant at a severe dis-
advantage. As he saw it, contemporary government's formal commit-
ment to safeguarding the rights of a criminal defendant had rendered 
meaningless the "traditional tenderness for persons accused of 
crime, "41 a sentiment with roots in arbitrary government. For this rea-
son, he saw little reason to explore the relationship between proce-
dural and substantive rights.42 
Gallo demanded that the SJC allow him to be tried separately 
from Cero. He argued quite reasonably that there was an enormous 
temptation for co-defendant Cero to perjure himself by testifying that 
Gallo was the sole perpetrator of the murder. Rugg cast Gallo's argu-
ment for a separate trial as old fashioned and not as a procedural 
right to which the defendant had a legitimate constitutional claim. In 
the opinion, Rugg explained, "The tendency in recent years ... has 
been away from formalities in the conduct of criminal trials. "43 To 
substantiate that generalization, Rugg pointed to the simplification of 
criminal indictments, a reform enacted by Massachusetts in 1876. For 
Rugg, Gallo's argument about due process was nothing but a quibble 
39 Gallo, 175 N.E. at 721, 722; BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 4, 1931. 
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harking back to a rigid system of common law rules. Therefore, the 
prosecution's decision to try both men at the same time on separate 
indictments and the trial judge's compliance with this procedure did 
not violate basic fairness or a substantive right. Rugg closed this issue 
by articulating a general rule: A criminal defendant had no "vested 
rights in matters merely procedural, bearing no vital connection with 
a real defense."44 In short, although the procedural system might be 
flawed, the court would not seriously entertain a challenge unless a 
capital defendant demonstrated that a specific and egregious due 
process violation had led directly to an erroneous finding of guilt.45 
Gallo also tried to argue for a new trial because of the oft-
disappearing Romano. Although the defense argued that Gallo's sec-
ond trial introduced new issues and questions not covered by Ro-
mano's earlier testimony, Rugg brushed aside that contention. The 
court affirmed Gallo's conviction, and he was sentenced to death.46 
Rugg's long tenure on the SJC ended just as the U. S. Supreme 
Court began to take a more expansive view of the relationship be-
tween the Bill of Rights and criminal procedure; he, perhaps, should 
not be faulted for not embracing that doctrine in the 1920s and 
1930s. But it is also true that Rugg never publicly worried about exe-
cuting an innocent person, or found that the police had abused their 
power, or that a defendant's confession had been anything other than 
voluntary and admissible. As he made clear in Gallo, Rugg generally 
presumed that the legal principles discovered and applied by modern 
courts had ended any threat to criminal defendants from an arbitrary 
and powerful government. 47 
Although Ehrmann and the MCADP had helped shift blame for 
Fantasia's murder from Cero to Gallo, as soon as the court sentenced 
Gallo to death, Ehrmann lobbied Democrat Governor Joseph Ely to 
commute Gallo's sentence to life imprisonment. Because of Ehr-
mann's lobbying, Ely's occasional abolitionist tendencies, and the 
length of the ordeal, Ely decided to commute Gallo's sentence. Flush 
with its first victories, the MCADP held a celebratory public meeting. 
44Id. 
45 Gallo, 175 N.E. at 721. Rugg gave two examples of the SJC's approval of the legisla-
ture's 1876 reform of criminal indictments: Commonwealth v. Snow, 169 N.E. 542 (Mass. 
1930) and Commonwealth v. Gedzium, 156 N.E. 890 (Mass. 1927). 
46 Gallo, 175 N.E. at 721,724. 
47 Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carotene Products Co. proposed that 
the Court should impose higher standards of review in areas of civil liberties and civil 
rights. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a collection of Rugg's public speeches, see 
generally ARTHUR PRENTICE RUGG, A MEMORIAL (1939). 
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Although all of the speakers were generally upbeat, including Cero's 
attorneys who praised the justice system for ultimately exonerating 
their client, Ehrmann highlighted the flaws inherent in a system that 
had brought Cero within a few hours of being wrongfully executed. 
"Have there been others not so fortunate as Cero Gangi," she asked. 
"Who can say. This case seemed in no respect unusual until the ap-
pearance of the Romano girl." In a follow-up pamphlet intended for 
state legislators, Ehrmann emphasized the system's fallibility: "It 
should be clearly understood that the last minute affidavit that stayed 
the execution was secured through no effort of the government nor 
of Cero's attorneys. The evidence was obtained by Cosimo Gangi." 
Her point was plain: The legal system did not save Cero's life; the in-
vestigative work and intervention ofa rank amateur did.48 
In the decades following the Cero and Gallo cases, Ehrmann 
worked to win passage of a law abolishing or weakening capital pun-
ishment, while Chafee sought to change criminal procedure by pro-
viding a greater degree of legal protection for capital defendants. 
Each year, carrying an armload of pamphlets and data meant to an-
swer any and all questions about abolition, Ehrmann personally lob-
bied everyone from rank and file members of the legislature to the 
governor, while Chafee worked behind the scenes to influence mem-
bers of the Massachusetts bar. 
Ehrmann rarely antagonized someone with whom she disagreed. 
Still, Ehrmann and her colleagues faced a difficult challenge punctu-
ated by developments they could not control. Ehrmann and Chafee 
contended with widespread public support for capital punishment. A 
1936 Gallop Poll, for example, found sixty-two percent of Americans 
in favor of the death penalty for murder.49 In addition, national and 
world events, including Prohibition, the Great Depression, crime 
waves, and World War II, overshadowed their single issue. Early in 
1941, for example, a friendly legislator told Ehrmann that she should 
"transfer her drive and energy to one of the organizations providing 
aid for Great Britain" and, near the war's conclusion, some MCADP 
members criticized Ehrmann for continuing to advocate abolition 
when Nazi war criminals were to be executed. The Rosenbergs' execu-
48 For Governor Ely's commutation of Gallo's death sentence, see BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
13,1931. For Ehrmann's remarks, see generally Sussman, supra note 12. 
49 Hazel Erskine, The Polls.' Capital Punishment, 34 PuB. OPINION Q. 291 (1970). 
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tions in June, 1953 further divided the nation.5o Despite these obsta-
cles and opinions, Ehrmann doggedly pursued the goal of abolition.51 
In the spring of 1934, while Ehrmann prepared MCADP testi-
mony to support Governor Ely's modest proposal to limit capital pun-
ishment to those convicted of first-degree murder, several murders 
seized the public's attention. In December 1933, an employee of a 
Fitchburg sporting goods store was murdered during a botched hold-
up; on January 2, 1934, two men shot and killed a Lynn movie theatre 
worker and fled with about $200; and during a bank robbery in 
Needham a month later, a man wielding a machine gun murdered a 
police officer and a firefighter. Three days after the Lynn robbery-
murder, police arrested two Boston cab drivers, Clement Molway and 
Louis Berrett, and charged them with the murder. At trial, no fewer 
than eight eyewitnesses identified the two men as the assailants. Each 
defendant took the witness stand on his own behalf. Berrett insisted 
he spent the morning of the crime aimlessly looking for his business 
partner, and Molway told the jury he cruised around Boston looking 
for fares without success. 
Essex County District Attorney Hugh A. Cregg sharply cross-
examined the two defendants, exposing holes and inconsistencies in 
their alibis. Mter two weeks of trial, a juror later reported, it seemed 
likely that the jury would find the two men guilty. But, on February 
27, in a special evening session at the old Salem courthouse, a "tired 
looking" Cregg asked Judge Thomas F. Hammond to allow a review of 
the evidence against the two men. "Shamefacedly, but manfully," each 
of the eight eyewitnesses acknowledged they had mistakenly identified 
Molway and Berrett as the murderers. Calling it an "act of Provi-
50 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were tried in 1951 for conspiracy to commit wartime es-
pionage, namely passing secret information about the United States' atomic bomb to the 
Soviet Union. Found guilty, Julius and Ethel were executed at sundown on June 19, 1953. 
See ROBERT MEEROPOL & MICHAEL MEEROPOL, WE ARE YOUR SONS, at xxx, xxxii (1986). 
51 For a good summary of Massachusetts politics during the 1930s and 1940s, see BAR-
BROOK, supra note 1, at 35-78. For an outline of Chafee's work for MCADP, see Letter from 
Zechariah Chafee to Sara Ehrmann, Mar. 1, 1933, Box 16, Folder 69, Ehrmann Papers, 
supra note 9 and Letter from Raynor Gardiner to Sara Ehrmann, Apr. 11, 1941, Box 4, 
Folder 18, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For women's mobilization during World War II, 
see DEGLER, supra note 15, at 418-35. Long-time MCADP member and professor Sheldon 
Glueck asked Ehrmann if she found it "embarrassing" to agitate for abolition "when the 
fate of the Nazi butchers will soon be at stake?" Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Sheldom 
Glueck, Feb. 2,1945, Box 17, Folder 53, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For information 
on the Rosenbergs, see Letter from Vivian Pierce to Sara Ehrmann, Mar. 6, 1953, Box 18, 
Folder 96 and Sara Ehrmann to Vivian Pierce, Mar. 16, 1953, Box 18, Folder 96, Ehrmann 
Papers, supra note 9. 
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dence," Cregg apologized to Molway and Berrett, and Judge 
Hammond set them free. Cregg explained to the jury that the three 
men apprehended for the Needham bank robbery had also confessed 
to two other crimes, including the Lynn murder. 52 
The Christian Science Monitor called the defendants' last minute 
reversal of fortune a "dramatic victory for justice," and Ehrmann 
worked the case into her presentation to the Judiciary Committee. 
She emphasized how close Molway and Berrett had come to wrongful 
convictions and death sentences. However, in the immediate after-
math of the Needham bank robbery and murder, Ehrmann's argu-
ment against capital punishment lost much of its power.53 
3. The Third Prong: MCADP Forges Ahead to the Governor's Office 
In addition to emphasizing the possibility of a fatal mistake, 
Ehrmann eagerly enlisted leading Massachusetts politicians, including 
a host of governors, in the campaign to abolish capital punishment. It 
was a strategy filled with disappointments. Early in her tenure at 
MCADP she was surprised and delighted, for example, when Boston's 
four-term mayor, the legendary James Michael Curley, accepted an 
invitation to serve as vice-chairman of the MCADP. However, every 
time Ehrmann asked him to speak in favor of abolition, Curley 
danced away. Mter many disappointments, Ehrmann wrote a terse 
letter to Curley. "Enclosed you will please find a membership blank 
which you may fill out and return with your check" if you wish to re-
main in MCADP. Ehrmann eventually received a letter instructing her 
to remove Curley's name from the masthead of the organization. Six 
years later, during Curley's one term as Massachusetts governor, he 
signed death warrants for four men, including the Needham bank 
robbers.54 
52 Ehrmann sometimes wrote speeches for Governor Ely. See, e.g., Governor Joseph Ely, 
Address of His Excellency Joseph B. Ely to the Two Branches of the Legislature of Massa-
chusetts (Jan. 5, 1933), Box 17, Folder 16, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Governor Jo-
seph Ely, Massachusetts Should Abolish Capital Punishment (Dec. 1931), Box 17, Folder 
16, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For information on Molway and Berrett's ordeal, see 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27,1934. 
53 CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 1,1934. For Erhmann's thank you to Berrett for tes-
tifYing before the Judiciary Committee, see Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Louis Berrett, 
Mar. 27, 1941, Box 23, Folder 57, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
54 Letter from Henry F. Brennan, Secretary ofJanles Michael Curley, to Executive Sec-
retary, MCADP, Feb. 9,1928, Box 16, Folder 88; Letter from James Michael Curley to Sara 
Ehrmann, Feb. 4,1929, Box 16, Folder 88; Letter from Curley to Ehrmann, Apr. 16,1929, 
Box 16, Folder 88; Letter from Curley to Ehrmann, May 14,1929, Box 16, Folder 88; Let-
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Ehrmann soon found herself a staunch, if moderate, new ally in 
the legislature: Representative Christian Herter. Herter, a Beacon Hill 
Republican, volunteered to steer MCADP's mercy bill through the 
House in 1932. However, Herter's freshman status and the nationwide 
furor over the Lindbergh kidnapping caused the Massachusetts mercy 
bill to go down to defeat. Herter felt responsible for the loss and 
apologized to Ehrmann. "You must feel I have been a very weak reed 
to lean on. I feel I mishandled things badly," he wrote. Ehrmann, 
touched by his apology, wrote to tell Herter that the bill's defeat was 
due to "deep seated prejudice and ignorance" and politicians' "fear of 
being recorded on a controversial measure." Next time, she promised, 
they would be better organized. Herter and Ehrmann continued to 
talk amicably and to work together constructively during the next two 
decades as Herter moved up the political ladder. Perhaps for this rea-
son, when Herter became governor in 1952, he refused to sign death 
warrants for convicted murderers for whom a jury did not recom-
mend life imprisonment as the mercy law allowed.55 
Although the death penalty touched many lives within the Com-
monwealth, the governors of Massachusetts each put their own 
unique, public stamp on the issue. Governor Joseph B. Ely, one of the 
first governors to confront abolition, befriended Ehrmann in 1932. 
Ely was a Yankee Democrat from Hampden County where he built a 
lucrative legal practice and served as district attorney before he was 
elected governor in 1930. Using speeches written by Ehrmann, Gov-
ernor Ely introduced bills to study the usefulness of capital punish-
ment and to except men and women "blinded by sudden passion" 
from first-degree murder charges. Capital punishment did not deter 
emotional murderers nor hardened criminals, Ely told the legislature. 
He cited the example of convicted murderer Joseph Belanski, who 
when sentenced to death said, ''What of it," adding, "electricity isn't 
such a bad way to die." The Governor also used statistics to make his 
point: From 1920 to 1930, there were ninety-one murders in Suffolk 
ter from Curley to Ehrmann, Sept. 28, 1929, Box 16, Folder 88; Letter from Ehrmann to 
Curley, Dec. 17, 1929, Box 16, Folder 88; Letter from Curley to Ehrmann, May 26, 1930, 
Box 16, Folder 88, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. Just one month into Curley's term, the 
State executed Alexander Kaminski on February 19, 1935 and then executed Needham 
bank robbers Murton Millen, Irving Millen, and Abraham Faber on June 7, 1935. BOWERS, 
supra note 2, at 449. 
55 Letter from Christian Herter to Sara Ehrmann, May 10, 1932, Box 17, Folder 77; 
Letter from Ehrmann to Herter, May 11, 1932, Box 17, Folder 77; Letter from Herter to 
Ehrmann, Dec. 13, 1938, Box 17, Folder 77; Letter from Ehrmann to Herter, Nov. 19, 
1940, Box 17, Folder 77, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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County leading to 122 indictments. However, the state only executed 
two men during this time.56 The conclusion was obvious: Capital pun-
ishment "leads to bargaining with guilty men." Despite Ehrmann's 
powerful data and the Governor's persuasive speech, the legislature 
looked askance at both bills. In part, legislators were eager to distance 
themselves from the Governor's widely criticized use of the pardoning 
power. The Boston Herald, for example, pointed out that in three years 
the Governor had issued an unprecedented 127 pardons, including 
pardons for twelve men convicted of first-degree murder. "The pe-
nologists, not the people, are getting the benefit of the doubt," the 
Herald fumed. Ely chose not to run for re-election in 1934.57 
Leverett Saltonstall, a Republican patrician with a "South Boston 
face" who occupied the governor's corner office for three terms from 
1939 to 1944, seemed open to Ehrmann's arguments for enacting a 
mercy law. As early as 1933, during his tenth term in the Massachu-
setts House, Saltonstall suggested that his views regarding capital pun-
ishment were changing, and he promised Ehrmann he would support 
a death penalty study. In addition, during the 1935 House debate on a 
mercy bill, Salton stall left the Speaker's chair, freeing his Republican 
colleagues to vote their consciences. When he took office as governor 
in 1939, one of the first meetings he held was with a Chafee-Ied law-
yers' committee lobbying for a mercy bill. Then, just a few months 
later, Saltonstall confronted the grim reality of putting someone to 
death. He rejected a petition to commute the death sentences of two 
young men convicted of murdering a Somerville shopkeeper from 
whom they took $3.50. The State originally planned to electrocute 
Wallace W. Green and Walter St. Sauveur in May 1939. However, the 
State's official executioner reported that the chair was not functional; 
the needed repairs took four months to complete. 
On August 1, Governor Saltonstall rejected a plea for clemency, 
stating that there were "no mitigating circumstances presented to me 
sufficient to alter the operation of the statutes of the Commonwealth 
as expressed through the jury's findings of fact and the court's ruling 
of law." With that formulaic pronouncement, the State of Massachu-
56 See Governor Joseph Ely, Massachusetts Should Abolish Capital Punishment, Adress 
Before the Massachusetts Legislature (Dec. 1931), Box 17, Folder 16, Ehrmann Papers, 
supra note 9. 
57 [d. The Heraklwrote twice about Ely's pardon policy. BOSTON HERALD,Jan. 12, 1934; 
BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 26, 1932. For a cautious endorsement of Ely's bill to distinguish 
passionate killers from "cold-blooded, clear-headed assassins," see BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 
1931. 
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setts set in motion the machinery of death. The two men moved into 
separate death cells at Charlestown State Prison, received religious 
counseling, and consumed "hearty last meals." At one minute after 
midnight, two guards handcuffed Green and led him from his cell to 
the execution chamber singing the hymn "Jesus Saves." Five shocks of 
electricity surged through Green's body. The electrodes were re-
moved from his body and replaced on three occasions. Green was 
pronounced dead at 12:23 a.m. St. Sauveur followed. The Reverend 
Ralph Farrell heard St. Sauveur's confession before the condemned 
man was strapped into the chair. Three shocks of electricity-1800 
volts, then 1500 volts, and finally 2100 volts-charged through St. Sau-
veur's body. After fifteen minutes, he was pronounced dead. The 
men's prolonged agony caused the official witnesses to writhe and the 
chaplains to flee the room. In the grim aftermath, angry officials and 
editorials condemned the "hideous bungling" of the executions and 
called for an end to the barbarous use of the electric chair.58 Publicly, 
Ehrmann said nothing specific about the brutal executions. As usual, 
she carefully prepared for the next legislative session, firmly believing 
she had Saltonstall's support for death penalty reform. During his 
campaign for a second term as governor, Saltonstall told Ehrmann 
that capital punishment was a matter for the people's representatives. 
"If I am [re-elected] Governor and a [mercy] bill reaches my desk," 
he told her, "I shall expect to approve it. "59 She reminded him of his 
pledge the following year, but like many other measures, the outbreak 
of war in Europe sidetracked the mercy bill. In the winter of 1943, 
however, Ehrmann's intense effort seemed likely to payoff. Governor 
Saltonstall sent a mercy bill to the legislature. Ehrmann then sent 
every member of the upper chamber a letter in which several former 
district attorneys called the Governor's proposal "a very moderate and 
reasonable one." She galvanized a long and eclectic list of supporters. 
58 Letter from Zechariah Chafee to Sara Ehrmann, Mar. 1, 1933, Box 16, Folder 69, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Francis Russell & Zechariah Chafee to Sara 
Ehrmann, Dec. 22, 1939, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Notes on 1935 Legislative Session, 
Sara Ehrmann, Box 5, Folder 10, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For the uial of Green and 
St. Sauveur, see BOSTON HERAlD, Oct. 5, 1938. After the two men were sentenced, Green 
cynically congratulated the prosecutor for his "personal victory," and St. Sauveur de-
nounced Green as "too rotten and yellow to square me." BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 5, 1938. 
For Saltonsta1l's statement rejecting clemency, see BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1939. For details 
about the execution, see BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1939. State Senator Charles Lane called 
use of the elecuic chair "barbaric and inhumane" and filed a bill substituting a gas cham-
ber for the elecuic chair. BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1939. 
S9 Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Leverett Saltonstall, Feb. 19,1941, Box 19, Folder 24, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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She asked Charles Sprague, member of the Republican State Commit-
tee, to write to Republicans on the Judiciary Committee, and she 
urged a cluster of sympathetic Boston lawyers to write key Democrats. 
Ehrmann also organized a parade of witnesses to speak in favor of the 
bill before the Judiciary Committee. 
Initially, it looked as though the mercy bill would sail through the 
legislature. Instead, the Judiciary Committee divided over whether the 
bill should allow jurors or the judge to make the sentencing decision. 
Late in May, Ehrmann wrote Governor Saltonstall urging him to in-
tervene. The "Senate situation is serious," she wrote, and the senators 
on the Judiciary Committee to whom she spoke "are under the im-
pression that you don't really care if the Bill is defeated." This rumor, 
she felt, encouraged the opponents of change. "Only word from you 
will save the Bill," she wrote following a "stormy session." The Gover-
nor said nothing, but a bill permitting a trial judge to sentence a capi-
tal defendant found guilty of first-degree murder to life imprisonment 
squeaked through the Senate and passed the House by a vote of 113 
to 94.60 
Although Ehrmann and the MCADP stood on the threshold of 
success, Saltonstall, unexpectedly and without explanation, killed the 
bill with a pocket veto.61 It seems likely that his cautious, general sup-
port for liberal ideas, two narrow electoral victories, and his hope to 
be elected to the U. S. Senate, caused Salton stall to back away from 
the controversial bill. Ehrmann felt betrayed.62 
As promising, but ultimately deeply disappointing as her rela-
tionship was with Salton stall, Ehrmann knew from the outset that Re-
60 Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Leverett Saltonstall, May 28, 1943, Box 19, Folder 24, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
61 A governor triggers a pocket veto by failing to sign a bill before the legislative ses-
sion ends. 
62 Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Leverett Saltonstall, Feb. 19, 1941, Box 19, Folder 24, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Sara Ehrmann to "Dear Governor" Salton stall, 
May 28, 1943, Box 19, Folder 24, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Charles Spra-
gue to Sara Ehrmann, Mar. 9, 1943, Box 19, Folder 47, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9 (stat-
ing that he had written in support of mercy bill). Sprague later agreed to become treasurer 
ofMCADP, a position he held until 1951. Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Leverett Salton-
stall, May 28, 1943, Box 19, Folder 24, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Alford 
Rudnick to Edward Rowe, May 12, 1943, Box 19, Folder 19, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; 
Letter from Charles Sprague to Sara Ehrmann, Nov. 2, 1951, Box 19, Folder 47, Ehrmann 
Papers, supra note 9. For letters about the Governor's pocket veto, see Letter from Herbert 
Ehrmann to Leverett Salton stall, Dec. 28, 1944, Box 19, Folder 24, Ehrmann Papers, supra 
note 9. For a source attributing the defeat to the murder of a Newburyport woman, see 
Miriam Van Waters, The Impact of the War on Our Youth, Address (Apr. 30, 1943), Box 
19, Folder 70, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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publican Governor Robert Bradford would be unlikely to embrace 
abolition. 63 As Middlesex County District Attorney, Bradford success-
fully prosecuted two young men for a murder committed during a gas 
station hold-up. According to defense attorney Henry Avery, the trial 
judge agreed to a plea bargain that would have permitted James 
Nickerson and Paul Giacomazza, neither of whom had a prior crimi-
nal record, to plead guilty to second-degree murder. Bradford insisted 
on first-degree murder and the death penalty. The two youths were 
convicted, sentenced to death, and executed on June 30, 1942. Seven-
teen-year-old Giacomazza was the first person in the history of the 
Commonwealth under the age of eighteen to be executed for mur-
der.54 
A few years later, Philip Bellino and Edward Gertson committed 
the murder that ultimately resulted in the last executions in Massa-
chusetts. The murder that placed Bellino and Gertson in the electric 
chair was not especially gruesome, nor did the Boston press give the 
story much coverage when it occurred on August 7, 1945. Tex Wil-
liams was shot in the back of the head and his body left in an ocean 
marsh not far from the main road connecting Boston to a string of 
north shore suburbs. Four days earlier, Williams had led Bellino, 
Gertson and Charles Mantia to a New Hampshire summer camp to 
rob an illegal dice game at gunpoint. Williams had promised a haul of 
at least $10,000, but when the gang met to divide up the loot, there 
was only a few hundred dollars. Angry and fearful that Williams would 
"squeal" to the police, Bellino, Gertson, and Mantia took Williams for 
a "ride." Just before midnight the four men crowded into a taxi, stop-
ping at an isolated spot along the road. Mantia remained with the cab 
driver while the three others walked out toward the ocean. Only Gert-
son and Bellino returned. When Mantia asked where Williams was, 
Gertson said he decided to "stay with his girl." A few days after the 
63 Letter from Robert Bradford to Sara Ehrmann, Feb. 11, 1941, Box 16, Folder 46, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
64 Letter from Robert Bradford to Sara Ehrmann, Apr. 2, 1940, Box 16, Folder 46, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Sara Ehrmann to MCADP Board, May 16, 
1940; Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Robert Bradford, Feb. 6, 1941, Box 16, Folder 46; Let-
ter from Bradford to Ehrmann, Feb. 11,1941, Box 16, Folder 46, Ehrmann Papers, supra 
note 9. Avery told Ehrmann he believed public criticism of Bradford's prosecution of 
young Giacomazzo caused Bradford to actively oppose any modification of capital pun-
ishment from that time forward. Letter from Herbert Avery to Sara Ehrmann, Apr. 26, 
1948, Box 16, Folder 46, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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discovery of Williams' body, Mantia led police to Gertson and Bel-
lino.65 
At trial, Mantia and taxi driver James Salah served as District At-
torney Hugh Clegg's star witnesses. Gertson and Bellino testified in 
their own defense. The jury found both Gertson and Bellino guilty of 
first-degree murder after deliberating less than six hours on June 18, 
1946. Judge Joseph L. Hurley sentenced the two men to death.66 
Gertson and Bellino appealed the verdict to the SJC. According 
to a recently enacted statute, the trial court had empanelled fourteen 
jurors at the outset of the trial, but dismissed two just prior to submit-
ting the case to the jury. Gertson and Bellino contended this proce-
dure violated their right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The SJC unanimously re-
jected the argument. 'We see nothing in this statute that contravenes 
the provisions of the Declaration of Rights for the preservation of trial 
by jury," Moreover, anticipating the defendants' appeal to the U. S. 
Supreme Court, the SJC added, the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution has "never been held to extend so far as to control 
the action of the States. "67 
Originally scheduled to die February 28, 1947, Governor Brad-
ford stayed the executions of Gertson and Bellino pending their ap-
peal to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the 
fourteen-person jury. As the SJC predicted, however, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. Shortly after the Court's refusal to review the 
convictions, Governor Bradford and the Executive Council granted 
the two men a reprieve, a gesture that was extended until May 8; they 
were executed the next day.68 Despite Governor Bradford's back-
ground, including allowing Gertson and Bellino to die in the electric 
chair, Ehrmann clung to the hope that Bradford would sign a mercy 
bill passed by the Massachusetts legislature in 1948. The bill allowed a 
jury finding a defendant guilty of first-degree murder to submit to the 
court a written statement outlining its reasons for recommending the 
defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment. Bradford did not re-
65 BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1945. For details about Williams' slaying surfacing during 
the trial of Gertson and Bellino, see BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1946; BOSTON GLOBE, June 
14,1946; BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 1946; BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1946. 
66 BOSTON GLOBE. June 15, 1946. 
67 Commonwealth v. Bellino, 71 N.E.2d 411, 415, 416 (Mass. 1947). For the fourteen-
person jury statute, still in existence today, see MAss. GEN LAws ch. 234. § 26B (2000). 
68 Bellino v. Massachusetts, 330 U.S. 832 (1946); BOSTON GLOBE, May 9,1947. Relatives 
of Gertson and Bellino visited with Governor Bradford on May 8, 1947, but the Governor 
refused to intervene. BOSTON HERALD, May 8,1947. 
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spond directly to Ehrmann, but on April 26, 1948--0ddly enough the 
very day the Supreme Court upheld an 1897 federal law allowing a 
jury to find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder, but qualify the 
verdict by adding "without capital punishment"-he vetoed the bill.69 
While Bradford acknowledged that "the idea of punishment by death 
was abhorrent," he insisted that "all the veneer of civilization had not 
lessened the savagery, brutality, or frequency of murder" and, there-
fore, of the need for capital punishment. The existing law divided re-
sponsibility, giving to the jury the task of determining the defendant's 
guilt or innocence and to the judge the burden of sentencing the 
convicted. By requiring a jury to determine both a defendant's guilt 
or innocence and an appropriate sentence, the mercy bill would "fas-
ten in the jury a far greater share of the total responsibility. " 
Bradford was unhappy with the bill's form and fearful of its pos-
sible outcomes. Because the probability of "mitigating circumstances" 
was high, Bradford believed no jury would support a death sentence. 
In short, the mercy bill would end the "deterrent effect of the death 
penalty" and, he predicted, the number of murders would climb. The 
mercy bill, the Governor concluded, "pays lip-service" to capital pun-
ishment, but "effectively destroys it by providing that the penalty 
should be imposed not by law, but by a jury of twelve men groping in 
the dark to agree on a reason for choosing between life and death. "70 
The public exhibited varying reactions to Bradford's veto. The 
New Bedford Standard Times cheered the Governor's action, adding that 
Massachusetts should be proud to be one of only five states that did 
not provide for some kind of alternative capital sentencing. The 
newspaper noted that Massachusetts should not be influenced by 
''what some other countries or States have done." This was the kind of 
reasoning that Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold found "un-
fortunate and indicative of the provincialism associated with New Eng-
land." Harvard Medical School Professor Alexander Forbes told Ehr-
mann he agreed with much of Bradford's legal argument but still felt 
that the "death penalty is archaic and barbarous." Forbes questioned 
MCADP's strategy and urged Ehrmann to work for outright abolition. 
The Boston Evening American and the Boston Herald condemned Brad-
ford's veto. "In his ill-becoming role of defender of legalized killing," 
the Boston Evening American editorialized, "Mr. Bradford rejects the 
69 Andresv. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 747 n.ll (1948). 
70 Id. The Court pointed out that in only four states "is death the inevitable penalty for 
murder in the first degree: Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont." Id. 
at 757. For Bradford's veto message, see BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 1948. 
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lessons of history which prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the 
death penalty does not prevent acts of violence, but is more apt to 
prompt them." The Herald added that the Governor's frightening pre-
sumption about a link between the death penalty and rising violent 
crime rates might well be unfounded. Crime rates "may not bear any 
relation to the severity of the legal penalty." For her part, Ehrmann 
wrote, "At this moment I am very tired and cannot think of the next 
step."71 
In the fall of 1948, however, Ehrmann plunged back into the bat-
tle, organizing "Independent Democrats for Dever," the Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate, writing a League of Women Voters pamphlet 
explaining the upcoming referendum issues, and helping to save Dr. 
Miriam Van Water's job as Superintendent of the Massachusetts Re-
formatory for Women. Democrat Paul Dever's November gubernato-
rial victory marked a watershed in Massachusetts politics and tilted 
the balance in the abolitionists' favor. On the campaign trail, Dever 
loudly promised jobs for veterans and a massive road-building pro-
gram. He whispered to liberals that he opposed capital punishment 
and that he would sign a mercy bill into law. To complement Dever's 
victory, a "fighting fund" directed by Massachusetts Speaker of the 
House Thomas "Tip" O'Neill (1949-1952) helped the Democrats take 
control of the House for the first time since before the Civil War. The 
Democrats also won half the state Senate seats and swept all the state-
wide offices. The Boston Herald celebrated the Democrats' victories by 
predicting the abolition of capital punishment was not far off. 72 
Just as Ehrmann began to prepare for the MCADP's annual legis-
lative campaign, her long-time ally Van Waters came under attack for 
her management of the Women's Reformatory. The Commissioner of 
Corrections, who had been appointed by former Republican Gover-
nor Bradford, ousted Van Waters from the superintendency, a posi-
tion she had held for seventeen years. The Commissioner charged 
that Van Waters illegally allowed women prisoners to work outside the 
facility and, more explosively, that she permitted homosexuality to 
71 NEW BEDFORD STANDARD TIMES, Apr. 26, 1948; Letter from Sara Ehrmann to James 
Donnoruma, Apr. 28, 1948, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For Griswold's public com-
ment, see BOSTON EVENING AM., Apr. 28, 1948; BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 28, 1948; Letter 
from Sara Ehrmann to Alexander Forbes, May 22, 1948, Box 5, Folder 14; Forbes to Ehr-
mann, May 1,1948, Box 5, Folder14, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
72 See BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 23, 1949. See generally BARBRooK, supra note 1, at 92. The 
Northeastern University Library collection of the Sara Ehrmann Papers includes materials 
covering her work with the League of Women Voters and other volunteer activities. See 
generally Ehrmann Activities, Box 39, All Folders, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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flourish inside the prison. Although the Commissioner never publicly 
accused Van Waters of being a lesbian, his aggressive investigation 
into her private life helped fuel the rumor that "something queer was 
going on." Ehrmann immediately came to Van Waters' aid, helping to 
organize the "Friends of the Framingham Reformatory," lobbying leg-
islators, and encouraging positive stories about Van Waters. A national 
newsmagazine, The Nation, for example, praised Van Waters' dedi-
cated work at the prison and argued that her progressive political and 
professional views were the real story behind her firing. 73 By March 
1949 a host of volunteers, including Eleanor Roosevelt, succeeded in 
restoring Van Waters to her position. However, that victory cost Ehr-
mann dearly. 74 
The mercy bill everyone thought certain to pass was swamped in 
the wake of the Van Waters' affair. Scurrilous rumors and innuendoes 
circulated that abolitionists were the "same crowd" who came to Van 
Waters' defense. Herald columnist "Billy" Mullins acknowledged the 
damaging link, but he attributed the defeat of the 1949 mercy bill to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman John Mackay's "fundame-
nalist" opposition to "any tampering with the law" and to an "atro-
cious murder" that caused two Bristol County senators to become 
"embittered against any relaxation of the capital punishment law." As 
a result, a mercy bill passed in the House, but lost by a single vote in 
the Senate.75 
Neither the Senate defeat nor the political risk of opposing capi-
tal punishment shook Governor Dever's commitment to abolition. 
Although he once stated publicly that he favored the death penalty 
under certain circumstances, during his two terms in office, Dever 
commuted every convicted murderer's death sentence to life impris-
onment. Among others, Dever acted to save the life of Frederick Pike, 
73 Edwin]. Lukas, Bridewell Revisited, THE NATION, Feb. 12, 1949, at 179-81. 
74 See id. For details of Van Waters' case, see ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, MATERNAL JUSTICE: 
MIRIAM VAN WATERS AND THE FEMALE REFORM TRADITION 274-312 (1996). Van Waters 
served as President of the AlACP from 1938 to 1949 and as such she worked more closely 
with Vivian Pierce, the long-time Executive Secretary of AlACP, than with Sara Ehrmann. 
Letter from Miriam Van Waters to Vivian Pierce, Nov. 12, 1938, Box 19, Folder 71, Ehr-
mann Papers, supra note 9. 
75 See WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Apr. 13,1949. In a September 23,1949, col-
umn, Mullins worried that recent books about Sacco-Vanzetti would undermine young 
people's belief in the law. Mullin's reference was to Charles McGarty's murder and rape of 
his sister's eight-year-old daughter. See Commonwealth v. McGarty, 82 N.E.2d 603, 604 
(Mass. 1948). The scandal also caused Van Waters to resign as president of the struggling 
AlACP; the MCADP assimilated the organization and Ehrmann became director. See Bos-
TON HERALD, Mar. 30, 1949. 
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a Charlestown youth sentenced to death for the murder of another 
boy during a robbery. The Governor also commuted the death sen-
tence of Joseph Galvin. Galvin, a mentally ill Dorchester man, stole a 
hand bag from a Dorchester woman, beat her to death, and then fled 
to a New York mental institution. At Ehrmann's urging, Governor De-
ver also commuted the death sentence of Edward Lee, an Mrican-
American railway cook convicted of murdering a Roxbury pawnbro-
ker. Ehrmann gathered information clearly showing Lee's court-
appointed counsel as exploitative and unprepared. Because of their 
obvious mitigating factors of youth, mental illness, and the lack of 
adequate counsel, Pike, Galvin, and Lee were relatively easy decisions 
for the Governor and the Executive Council. However, Dever also 
commuted death sentences of more difficult cases, including that of 
Charles McNeill, convicted of the merciless roadside shooting death 
of an insurance salesman, and of two men, Charles McGarty and Vin-
cent Dellechiaie, convicted of sexually assaulting and murdering two 
girls, aged seven and eight. 76 
Dever's actions drew praise and sharp criticism from the press. 
Nevertheless, Dever retained his steadfast commitment to abolition. 
Billy Mullins cheered Dever's fairness and commitment to due proc-
ess. The Governor recognized that Pike's youth and troubled upbring-
ing cried out for mercy and that inadequate court-appointed attor-
neys placed poor capital defendants at a severe disadvantage. Other 
newspapers contended, however, that regardless of the mitigating cir-
cumstances, Dever had no right to "thwart the wishes of the courts, 
the legislature and the people, no one of whom has ever indicated a 
76 Dever stated he would not commute a death sentence for someone convicted of a 
murder for profit. DAILY LYNN ITEM,July 26,1951. Dever commuted to life imprisonment 
the death sentences of eight men. See generally Commonwealth v. Lee, 88 N.E.2d 713 (Mass. 
1949); Commonwealth v. Pike, 86 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. 1949); Commonwealth v. White, 81 
N.E.2d 823 (Mass. 1948) (the companion case is Commonwealth u William White); Com-
monwealth v. Galvin, 80 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 1948); BOSTON HERALD, June 30,1949; Letter 
from Wilbur Hollingsworth to Sara Ehrmann, Nov. 28,1949, Box 26, Folder 13, Ehrmann 
Papers, supra note 9; Letter from R.E. Lee to Sara Ehrmann, Dec. 5, 1949, Box 26, Folder 
n, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. Furthermore, Dever commuted the death sentence of 
Charles McCarty convicted of murdering an eight-year-old girl. See generally Common-
wealth v. McGarty, 82 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1948). And, Dever commuted the death sentence 
of Vmcent Dellechiaie, convicted of murdering a seven-year-old girl. See generally Com-
monwealth v. Dellechiaie, 84 N.E.2d 7 (Mass. 1949). Lastly, the Governor commuted 
McNeil's sentence. Commonwealth v. McNeil, 104 N.E.2d 153, 155 (Mass. 1952). The 
Southbridge News was not impressed with the mitigating evidence introduced at McNeil's 
commutation hearing that as a boy he had been beaten by his father and mistreated by 
juvenile authorities. "Had the jurors known all this, we assume they would have sent the 
judge tojail and killer to the bench." SOUTHBRIDGE NEws,Apr.n, 1952. 
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desire to eliminate capital punishment. " The Boston Herald noted that 
Dever was "nullifying the capital punishment law instead of seeking its 
repeal." The paper also noted that Dever, who recently had an-
nounced plans to run for an additional term, was not likely to suffer 
in the campaign because many Republicans and Independents silently 
supported the Governor on the death penalty issue. In fact, neither 
an abstract commitment to due process nor a political calculus fully 
explains Dever's motivation. Sitting on a park bench with Boston Trav-
eler columnist Clem Norton, Dever revealed his deep personal feelings 
about the death penalty: 
I question whether I or any human has the power to take a 
life. If I let a person die, I could see his mother crying at the 
grave, hear the clods of earth as they were shoveled onto the 
coffin. I woke up a couple of times at night in a sweat when I 
felt that I had to let a man die, but I am glad that I never 
did.77 
Dever's commitment to abolition opened the way to passage of 
the mercy law in 1951. "Success-At Long Last" proclaimed Ehrmann 
when the bill breezed through the Democratic House and the Repub-
lican-controlled Senate and was signed by Governor Dever on April 3, 
1951. With the exception of murder committed in the course of a 
rape or an attempted rape, the new Massachusetts law stipulated that 
whoever was guilty of murder in the first degree, "shall suffer the pun-
ishment of death, unless the jury shall by their verdict, and as a part 
thereof, upon and after consideration of all the evidence, recommend 
that the sentence of death be not imposed. "78 If the jury determined 
that death was not an appropriate penalty, the law required that the 
court sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of parole. 
Ehrmann publicly praised the "clear thinking and sense of jus-
tice" manifestetl by the majority of legislators and the "enlightened 
understanding and human sympathy" of Governor Dever. Although 
some abolitionists believed the law eliminated capital punishment de 
facto, Ehrmann quickly put the victory into perspective. The statute 
rid the state of an "archaic mandatory law" and brought Massachu-
setts into conformity with the vast majority of other states, however, it 
77 BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 13, 1952; BOSTON HERALD, June 30, 1949; BOSTON 'IRAVELER, 
Apr. 14, 1958; SOUTHBRIDGE NEWS, Apr. 11, 1952. 
78 1951 Mass. Acts 203. 
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was only a step towards abolition. Therefore, against the advice of 
some MCADP members who counseled "a considerable interlude" 
before mounting an abolition effort, Ehrmann immediately launched 
a campaign to end capital punishment in Massachusetts. 79 
II. THE MIDDLE PHASE: ABOLITIONISTS STAND FIRM IN THE 
1950s AND EARLY 1960s 
For the next fifteen years, Ehrmann fought against the death 
penalty using the same tactics that had led to enactment of the mercy 
bill. Generally speaking, the political landscape she confronted after 
1951 gave abolitionists an advantage. Nationally, fewer and fewer peo-
ple were being put to death.8o By 1966 the number of people support-
ing the death penalty had fallen to forty-two percent, a record low.81 
At the same time, a growing number of people believed that the 
steady increase in violent crime called for tougher criminal penalties, 
including greater use of the death penalty. 
Massachusetts politics reflected this mixed trend. On the broad 
coattails of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952, Bay State Republicans briefly 
regained control of the House and Senate, and Christian Herter nar-
rowly defeated incumbent Governor Dever. Given Herter's warm per-
sonal relationship with Ehrmann and his sympathy, if not outright 
support, for abolition, his victory was not a major setback for the 
campaign to end capital punishment in Massachusetts. But the attor-
ney general's office went to Republican George Fingold, the first Jew 
to win statewide office and a crusader "against crime, graft and Com-
munism." From 1952 to 1958, Attorney General Fingold called for the 
vigorous use of the death penalty while Herter-and his six successors 
in the governor's office-refused to carry out court-ordered death 
sentences. Massachusetts capital juries used the mercy law to recom-
mend life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in 100 of the 
132 convictions for first-degree murder from 1951 to 1972. This rec-
79 1951 Mass. Acts 203; BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1951; MCADP postcard proclaiming 
victory, Apr. 5,1951, Box 5, Folder 17, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Sara 
Ehrmann to Charles Sprague,]une 19, 1951, Box 19, Folder 47; Sprague to Ehrmann, Nov. 
2,1951, Box 19, Folder 47, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. The Senate added mandatory 
death penalty for rape-murder language; the Senate passed the bill by one vote. H.R. No. 
2148 (1951), reprinted in THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS]OURNAL OF THE SEN-
ATE OF 1951, at 611 (1951). 
80 HAINES, supra note 4, at 12. 
81 Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 6, at 1249. 
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ord only slightly lessened the public pressure on Massachusetts gover-
nors.82 
A. Kenneth Chapin Tests the Commonwealth 
In the spring of 1956 Governor Herter and the Executive Council 
vigorously debated whether to commute to life imprisonment the 
death sentence of Kenneth Chapin, an eighteen-year-old Springfield 
youth convicted of murdering fourteen-year-old Lynn Ann Smith and 
four-year-old Steven Ross Goldberg, one of the two children under 
Smith's care on the night of September 25, 1954. There were thirty-
eight stab wounds on Lynn Ann's upper body, and her neck was bro-
ken. Steven's skull was fractured, and he had been stabbed more than 
twenty times. Police launched a citywide manhunt for a "powerful 
maniac." Two weeks after the murders, however, Chapin freely con-
fessed to Springfield police. He said he had no reason for murdering 
Lynn Ann. When she opened the Goldberg's door in response to his 
knock, Chapin was wearing his father's hat andjacket and holding a 
knife. "She just screamed and I stabbed her. It was intended as a joke 
but it back-fired." he told police. Chapin "went after the boy with the 
knife because he was afraid the boy, [who awoke during the melee 
would] recognize him. "83 Mter the slaying, Chapin ran to his own 
house just a few doors away where he washed the blood from his shirt 
and hid the knife in his bedroom. A few days later he acted as one of 
the pallbearers at Lynn Ann's funeral. 84 
The trial, the SJC hearing, and the Executive Council delibera-
tion all focused on Chapin's sanity. Mter Hampden County Superior 
Court Judge Charles Fairhurst rejected repeated defense motions for 
additional psychiatric testing, a jury convicted Chapin of first-degree 
murder. Judge Fairhurst sentenced Chapin to death, but deferred 
execution pending motions for a new trial and an appeal to the state's 
82 See HAINES, supra note 4, at 12. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 
327 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 1975) (O'Neall). Although Ehrmann's work was important 
after 1951, the mercy law's success shifted the movement's focus to the governor's office. 
See Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 6, at 1249. Herter served as Massachusetts governor 
from 1953 to 1956 when he accepted an appointment as United States Under-Secretary of 
State. Massachusetts Republicans held the House and Senate under Herter but not again 
thereafter. BARBROOK, supra note 1, at 95-100. For Fingold's comment, see N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 1958. The data on the number of capital jury recommendations of life imprison-
ment is compiled from Massachusetts Reports. 
83 Commonwealth v. Chapin, 132 N.E.2d 404, 406-07 (Mass. 1956). 
84 [d.; BOSTON GLOBE,Apr. 28, 1954; BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1954. 
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highest court. Before the SJC, defense counsel contended, among 
other arguments, that the trial court's means of determining whether 
Chapin was criminally responsible were inadequate and erroneous. 
However, the SJC sustained the jury's guilty verdict and Chapin's 
death sentence.85 
Following Chapin's failed SJC appeal, Governor Herter asked Dr. 
Jack Ewalt, Massachusetts Commissioner of Mental Health, to exam-
ine Chapin. Ewalt's report found Chapin legally sane, but the doctor 
concluded he "appeared to be a schizod, isolated, emotionally 
flattened individual." On the basis of Ewalt's report, Herter recom-
mended that the Council commute Chapin's death sentence to life 
imprisonment. "There is no rational explanation for the two horrible 
crimes committed by Chapin," Herter stated on April 26, 1956, but 
"society would not be benefited by the execution of Chapin because 
of his abnormal characteristics and questionable personality condi-
tion, as well as his youth and complete lack of prior criminality." De-
spite Herter's decision in Chapin's case, he was not prepared to aban-
don the death penalty in general. Mter a month's study, the Council 
rejected Herter's clemency recommendation. Councilor Endicott 
"Chub" Peabody declared he could not vote for commutation because 
Chapin was sane at the time of the murder. A week later, however, the 
Council granted another six-month respite to allow defense attorneys 
to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court. 86 
While various advocates were trying to save Chapin, Attorney 
General Fingold aggressively pushed his pro-death penalty agenda. 
Although Fingold said nothing publicly during the Council's delibera-
tions, he had made his position clear. Gearing up for a gubernatorial 
run, he gave a number of speeches about "killers and commutation." 
The New Bedford Standard Times cheered the Attorney General for call-
ing attention to murderers who escaped the death penalty because of 
executive clemency. The Boston Independent Democrat quoted Fingold as 
blaming the "current reign of terror" on the fact that Massachusetts 
was not enforcing the death penalty. He told a Boston audience that 
the state should "dust away the cobwebs which have grown over the 
electric chair at Charlestown." And in a speech to the Beverly 
Women's Republican Club, Fingold said, "No one goes to the chair in 
Massachusetts is becoming the slogan among criminals." The Attor-
85 Chapin, 132 N.E.2d at 410, 415. 
B6 BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1956; BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 26, 1956; BOSTON HERALD, 
Dec. 16, 1955; BOSTON TRAVELER, Nov. 29, 1956; Letter from Dr. Jack Ewalt to Endicott 
Peabody,June 7, 1956, Box 17, Folder 20, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
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ney General had forced the issue of capital punishment into the next 
governor's race.87 
The Supreme Court capped off Fingold's popular demand to 
"dust off the chair" and the Council's opposition to commutation 
when they denied certiorari on October 8, 1956. Authorities moved 
Chapin to Walpole Prison's death house, and scheduled his execution 
for December 1. Attorney Sears and Governor Herter asked the 
Council to hear testimony from Dr. Frederick Wertham, a distin-
guished New York psychiatrist who had examined Chapin. On No-
vember 28, speaking in heavily German-accented English, Wertham 
confidently stated that Chapin "didn't know right from wrong-he 
didn't have the capacity to know." To deliberately take the life of a 
mentally ill person, Wertham told the Councilors, would "compound 
the wrong." Wertham explained that although everyone wants to pre-
vent future murders, "we won't accomplish that end by sending a sick 
boy to the electric chair." 
The day following Wertham's argument, a group gathered at 
Ehrmann's Brookline home to await the Council's decision. Shortly 
after 11:30 a.m., attorney Sears called Ehrmann with the good news: 
The Council voted six to three in favor of commutation. One angry 
Councilor publicly claimed that commuting Chapin's death sentence 
"declared open season on children." Surprisingly, Chub Peabody re-
versed his earlier negative vote and approved commutation. The pro-
cess changed Peabody's mind about capital punishment. Peabody, 
who later played a more prominent role in the death penalty debate 
when he became governor in 1962, credited Ehrmann for his trans-
formation.88 
The Boston Herald praised everyone who had worked to save 
Chapin and concluded that Massachusetts was the better for their ef-
fort. "What stands out vividly today," the Herald editorialized, 
[I] s the fact that Massachusetts has finally decided to keep a 
life rather than take one. An unimportant life, too, a warped 
87 BEVERLY TIMES, Apr. 7, 1953; BOSTON INDEP. DEMOCRAT, Feb. 11, 1955; NEW BED-
FORD STANDARD TIMES, Apr. 23, 1955. 
88 Commonwealth v. Chapin, 132 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 857 
(1956); BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1956; NEW BEDFORD STANDARD TIMES, Apr. 23, 1955. 
Many years later, Ehrmann recalled the dramatic events of the Chapin case in the Worcester 
Telegram. WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1966. Councilor Charles Gabriel 
expressed his dislike with the Chapin decision. ROCKLAND STANDARD, Nov. 28, 1957. 
Chapin's Springfield neighbors were divided over the clemency decision. BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 30, 1956. 
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and crippled life, a life of little value to the boy himself, a life 
that will now fritter away in the bleak inconsequence of 
prison existence. But Massachusetts has chosen to keep even 
such a lesser life, and by that choice has imbued all human 
life with a special consecration. Even the affront of murder 
of two children has not moved us to execute.89 
317 
B. A Commission s Conclusion: More Legal and Social Harm Than Good 
Governor-elect Foster Furcolo said nothing about Chapin, but 
during his convincing win over Republican Thomas H. Buckley in 
1956, Furcolo had used information supplied by Ehrmann to call for 
a commission to study the question of capital punishment. An affable, 
approachable politician, Furcolo worked his way through Yale College 
and Yale Law School before enlisting in the United States Navy during 
World War II. When he returned home, he opened a law practice in 
Springfield and won election to Congress in 1948, only the second 
Democrat in Bay State history to win a congressional seat from west-
ern Massachusetts. He served in the House until 1952 when Governor 
Dever appointed him Massachusetts State Treasurer. Following an un-
successful run for the U. S. Senate, Furcolo became the first Italian-
American governor in Massachusetts history, garnering 53% of the 
votes cast. In his 1957 inaugural address, he railed against political 
corruption and championed the idea of a "Special Commission for 
Investigating and Studying the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Capi-
tal Cases." In April, a House-Senate joint resolution created the 
fifteen-member Commission that began meeting in the summer of 
1957.90 
For more than eighteen months, the Commission listened and 
debated the efficacy and desirability of the death penalty in Massa-
89 BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 30, 1956. The Patriot-Ledger argued that the Council's com-
mutation of Chapin's death sentence to life imprisonment "makes it apparent that the use 
of capital punishment in Massachusetts has been suspended." PATRIOT-LEDGER, Dec. 1, 
1956. 
90 BOSTON GLOBE, July 6, 1955; Letter from Tom Ehrlich, Chief of Staff to Governor 
Furcolo, to Sara Ehrmann,July 25, 1956, Box 17, Folder 43, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
See generally REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING AND STUDYING THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN CAPITAL CASES H.R. No. 2575 (1959) [hereinafter REpORT ON ABOLITION]. Of the 
Commission's fifteen members, the President of the Senate appointed three members, the 
Speaker of the House appointed five members, and the Governor appointed seven mem-
bers. Id. at title page. Massachusetts Police Chiefs Association members were angry that the 
Governor did not appoint one of its members. CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 21,1957. 
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chusetts. The Commission heard dozens of passionate and reasoned 
arguments from lawyers, law enforcement officials, legislators, lobby-
ists, religious leaders, and interested citizens. Its report was thoughtful 
and carefully drafted, but divisive all the same. Mter sketching out the 
comparative history of the use of the death penalty in the United 
States, the report addressed three broad issues: the relationship of the 
death penalty and its use to the rate of murder in Massachusetts; the 
effect of the death penalty on the administration of justice; and the 
moral arguments for and against capital punishment.91 
The Commission's comparative analysis revealed that from 1933 
to 1956, Massachusetts executed twenty-four persons. In addition, the 
Commission discovered that the average per capita murder rate for 
Massachusetts was low, just 1.5 per 100,000 people.92 By comparison, 
in southern states where capital punishment was most frequently 
used, the rates of murder were far higher.93 Still, the Commission ac-
knowledged that comparative data alone could not answer the ques-
tion of whether abolition of the death penalty would be likely to in-
crease the number of murders generally or specifically increase the 
danger to police officers. 
The Massachusetts police chiefs who testified before the Commis-
sion insisted that warning an armed felon that if he killed someone he 
would "burn" had a deterrent effect.94 However, John A. Murphy, the 
Providence Chief of Police who hailed from a state where capital pun-
ishment had not been practiced since 1852, maintained that public 
safety was not enhanced by capital punishment. Father Donald Cam-
pion, SJ. buttressed this latter point of view with a systematic com-
parative study. He concluded that there was no "empirical support to 
the claim that the existence of the death penalty in the statutes of a 
state provides a greater protection to the police than exists in states 
where that penalty has been abolished. "95 
Conceding, for the sake of argument, the right of the state to 
take a life, the Commission worried that an innocent person might be 
put to death. While no systematic study of erroneous executions ex-
isted, there was evidence that raised serious doubts about the guilt of 
91 See generally REPORT ON ABOUTION, supra note 90. 
92 Id. at 15. 
93 Id. According to the Repurt, the average per capita murder rate for the United States 
in 1957 was 5.1 per 100,000 people. The rate of murder in the six highest southern states 
averaged five to twelve times higher than the New England states. Id. 
94 Id. at 18. 
95 Id. at 15-16, 18,21. 
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some persons who had been put to death in other states. No such mis-
takes were known to have been made in Massachusetts, but the Com-
mission pointed out that innocent men such as Gangi Cero, Louis 
Berrett, and Clement Molway had come perilously close to being exe-
cuted and that a handful of men imprisoned for second-degree mur-
der were subsequently exonerated of guilt. Therefore, the Commis-
sion concluded that capital punishment was too risky.96 A sentence of 
life imprisonment for first-degree murder not only avoided the risk of 
executing an innocent person, but also, according to available data, 
raised no risk to the community should the prisoner be pardoned or 
paroled. The Commission found that of the thirty-five persons con-
victed of first-degree murder in Massachusetts between 1900 and 1958 
who were serving a life sentence either as a result of commutation or 
jury recommendation, twenty-five were still in prison or had died. Pa-
role or pardon released ten "lifers" after serving an average of twenty-
two years in prison. None of the men released was subsequently con-
victed of any crime.97 
The Commission also weighed the moral arguments for and 
against capital punishment. Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn and the Rev-
erend Dana Greeley, two religious leaders who sat on the Commission 
and whom Ehrmann enlisted in the abolitionist cause, argued that 
"the only moral ground on which the state could conceivably possess 
the right to destroy human life would be if this was indispensable for 
the protection and preservation of other lives." "This places the bur-
den of proof," the clergymen insisted, "on those who believe that 
capital punishment exercises a deterrent effect on the potential 
criminal. Unless they can establish that the death penalty does, in fact, 
protect others at the expense of one, there is no moral justification 
for the State to take a life." The clergymen pointed out that those who 
support the death penalty by referring to the biblical iJtiunction to 
take an "eye for an eye" overlook the fact that, "this represented a 
limitation upon the then existing practice of unlimited vengeance." 
Rabbi Gittelsohn also recognized that the New Testament expressed a 
principle that, while not always realized in practice, is a goal worth 
seeking to attain: "Love your enemies. ''98 
96REpORT ON ABOliTION, supra note 90, at 25-27. 
97 Id. at 29-30. 
98 Id. at 34-35. Sara Ehrmann and Rabbi Gittelsohn had corresponded at least since 
Nov. 9, 1955, when Gittelsohn told Ehrmann that he was "deeply interested in this [aboli-
tion] work." Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Rabbi Gittelsohn, Nov. 9, 1955, Box 17, Folder 
51, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. The Reverend Greeley also had a relationship with 
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A majority of the Commission concluded that capital punishment 
did not offer the community more protection against murder than 
life imprisonment and that it did more harm than good to the legal 
and social order. There was reason to believe that murder trials would 
be shorter and "conviction more swift and certain, if life imprison-
ment rather than death were the maximum penalty."99 The Commis-
sion pointed out that not only is capital punishment contrary to the 
ideal goal of individual rehabilitation, but the death penalty tends to 
cheapen human life and to encourage adults and children to believe 
that violence is the proper way to resolve problems. For all these rea-
sons, the majority urged enactment of a law providing for a manda-
tory life sentence without the possibility of parole for murder in the 
first degree,loo 
Three Commission members dissented from the majority's call 
for abolition of the death penalty. State Senator Mary L. Fonseca 
thought the people should decide whether to abolish the death pen-
alty101 and House member John R. Sennott did not believe the "mere 
possibility of error ... can be urged as a reason why the right of the 
State to inflict the death penalty can be questioned in principle. "102 
The final and most damaging dissent to the abolitionist cause (be-
cause of the Commonwealth's very large and politically powerful 
Catholic population), came from Monsignor Thomas J. Riley. He 
spelled out the Catholic Church's orthodox position on capital pun-
ishment in absolute terms. The supreme and all-perfect God created 
man and he is, therefore, capable of self-determined activity during 
his earthly existence. While man is on earth he operates within God's 
moral law which establishes Christian society's social parameters. 
Within that frame, the purpose of the state is to provide for man's 
temporal needs, a goal that implies divine authorization to take what-
ever steps are necessary to protect and preserve society. For that rea-
son, the state may "claim the right, in the name of God, to take away 
human life in circumstances in which this would appear clearly to be 
in accord with God's own will."103 
Ehrmann. See Letter from Dana McLean Greeley to Sara Ehrmann,July 17,1959, Box 17, 
Folder 60, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
99 REpORT ON ABOUTION, supra note 90, at 44. 
100 [d. at 44-46. 
101 REpORT ON ABOUTION, supra note 90, at 76 (citing the minority view of Senator 
Mary L. Fonseca of Fall River). 
102 REPORT ON ABOUTION, supra note 90, at 72 (citing the minority report). 
105 [d. at 65,72,74. 
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Not all Catholic clergy adhered to the orthodox position articu-
lated by Monsignor Riley. In the months preceding and following the 
Commission's final report, Ehrmann orchestrated an effort to spot-
light Catholics who supported abolition of the death penalty. Shortly 
after Governor Furcolo's call for a study commission, the Reverend 
Edward Hartigan, Chaplain at Norfolk State Prison, published an anti-
capital punishment argument in the Pilot, the official newspaper of 
the Boston archdiocese. Hartigan agreed that the state received its 
authority from God through natural law and that the state was em-
powered to punish crime, including the taking of human life, if that 
were necessary to protect society. But, Hartigan emphasized the state's 
right to take life was not absolute. If it could be shown that life im-
prisonment was just as effective a deterrent to murder as capital pun-
ishment, then "the State is morally wrong to use the death penalty." 
Hartigan left no doubt where he stood on the issue: He thought the 
deterrent effect of the death penalty was "overestimated" and" very 
poor."104 
The Reverend John Grant, editor of Ave Mana, a popular devo-
tional magazine, Father Robert Drinan, SJ., a professor at Boston Col-
lege Law School, and Reverend Charles E. Sheedy, Dean of the Col-
lege of Arts and Sciences at Notre Dame, also spoke out against 
capital punishment. Grant rehearsed the orthodox argument, but in-
sisted that every other means of deterring murder had to be ex-
hausted before the state may resort to capital punishment. According 
to Grant, if an investigation indicated that life imprisonment was "just 
as effective as the electric chair for the protection of society, then the 
State must employ the lesser punishment to attain its end." Father 
Drinan took opposition to the death penalty a step further. In a widely 
circulated leaflet, he argued that the Catholic Church had no official 
position on the death penalty. "While the Church has never con-
demned capital punishment," Drinan wrote in December 1957, "the 
tendency of the last century in predominately Catholic countries has 
been to abolish the death penalty." In short, abolitionism and Ca-
tholicism were not necessarily contradictory. Reverend Charles E. 
Sheedy echoed Drinan's call for abolition. In a statement to the Mas-
sachusetts Judiciary Committee, Sheedy outlined his blunt, passionate 
views: 
104 THE PILoT,jan. 21, 1956. 
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So much slaughter has been done in the name and under 
the cover of religion that it is time the goodness and mild-
ness of Jesus had their say. The cloak of religion has covered 
both the just and the unjust. The false priests buzzed about 
the martyrs; the prison chaplain hears the last confession of 
the condemned murderer. I can see where a person might 
hold the view, reluctantly, regretfully, sorrowfully, that the 
miserable state of society requires the penalty of death for 
crime. But to put this under God, to connect it up with His 
will and His law, is intolerable. I think God wants it out.105 
Before the Commission published its majority report calling for 
the abolition of capital punishment, the Republican Party united be-
hind the gubernatorial candidacy of pro-death penalty advocate Fin-
gold. On Saturday, August 30, 1958, Fingold kicked off his campaign 
with a rally at the Sons of Italy hall in East Boston. He gave a rousing 
speech condemning Governor Furcolo. The following morning, while 
reading the newspaper in his Concord backyard, Fingold suffered a 
stroke and died instantly. Just two months before the general election, 
the Republicans were without a gubernatorial candidate. Although 
tainted by bribery scandals within his administration, the Democratic 
incumbent Foster Furcolo easily won a second term by defeating his 
hastily chosen opponent, Charles Gibbons. The Republican candidate 
for governor chose not to beat the drum for capital punishment nor 
make an issue of the fact that Furculo had commuted the death sen-
tences of Domenick L. Bonomi, convicted of murdering his wife, and 
three men convicted of robbing and murdering a Newton man.106 
Furcolo's victory and that of other legislators thought to be fa-
vorable to abolition led Ehrmann to be optimistic about the chances 
105 AVE MARIA, May 4, 1957. Drinan's testimony before the Commission was summa-
rized in a leaflet and reported in many newspapers, including the springfield Union. 
SPRINGFIELD UNION, Dec. 10, 1957. Sheedy made his statement February 19,1964; it was 
reprinted and circulated by MCADP and the AlACP, which Ehrmann also guided. See 
Capital Punishment Pamphlet, Box 37, Folder 5, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For ex-
cerpts from Sheedy's statement, see BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 1964. Richard Cardinal Cush-
ing, Archbishop of Boston, said that his "personal reaction" was "to regret that capital pun-
ishment is a law on the books of the Commonwealth." Richard Cardinal Cushing, THE 
MENTOR, A PENAL PuBUCATION, Mar. 1967, at 1-2. 
106 See generally Commonwealth v. Devlin, 141 N.E.2d 269 (Mass. 1957); Commonwealth 
v. Bonomi, 140 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. 1957). For Fingold's remarks, see BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. 
28, 1958. Commissioner of Corrections Arthur Lyman believed that Devlin, Arsenault, and 
LeBanc should be executed; publicly, however, he favored commuting Bonomi's death 
sentence. BOSTON HERALD,June 27, 1957; CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 27, 1957. 
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of ending capital punishment when the legislature met in 1959. "My 
over-all view," Ehrmann said of the fall election results, "is that al-
though we have lost a few good friends who supported our cause, it 
looks like we have gained a good deal of support in both houses." The 
promising results of a questionnaire Ehrmann had sent to every can-
didate for political office in Massachusetts, coupled with the Commis-
sion's report, indicated that an abolition bill had a good chance of 
passing. In fact, the Judiciary Committee favorably reported a bill and 
the full Senate embraced it. But, as the session wound down, the 
House rejected abolition, dashing Ehrmann's hopes once again. IO' 
C. On the Brink of Abolition 
At the conclusion of his second term, Governor Furcolo ran for 
U. S. Senate. As a result, political newcomer Republican John Volpe 
finished ahead of joseph Ward, a Fitchburg Democrat, in the wide-
open race for the governor's office in 1960. A devout Catholic, Volpe 
had climbed from a construction laborer to C.E.O. of his own na-
tional construction company. The campaign focused on the "elimina-
tion of corruption and scandal" and the sales tax. But for the eight 
years during which Volpe, Chub Peabody, and then Volpe again, held 
the governor's office, far more sweeping and contentious issues de-
manded attention. National and international issues forced their way 
into nearly every political decision made in Massachusetts. The civil 
rights movement, the Supreme Court's due process revolution, and 
the decline in the number of executions nationwide complicated the 
debate over capital punishment. Simultaneously, the Massachusetts 
murder rate rose, a Boston serial killer ran loose, and the murder of a 
police officer by a radical political gang created a loud public outcry 
for use of the death penalty.I08 
107 See generally REPORT ON ABOUTlON, supra note 90. According to Ehrmann's count, 
seventy-two of the ninety-two people who sought election to the Massachusetts House fa-
vored abolition. BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1959; BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 20, 1959; CmuSTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 1958. 
108 BARBROOK, supra note 1, at 132-34. Volpe won a two-year term in 1960, lost to 
Peabody in 1962, and then reclaimed the statehouse in 1964 and again, for a four year 
term, in 1966. See id. at 132, 138, 142, 152-53. Volpe served only two years of his last term 
before joining the Nixon administration as Secretary of Transportation; from 1969-1970, 
Lieutenant Governor Francis Sargent served as acting governor. [d. at 155. The Massachu-
setts murder rate more than doubled from 1950 to 1970.]. EDGAR HOOVER, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1970, at 76 (1971);]. EDGAR HOOVER, UNIFORM CRIME REpORT 1950, at 89 
(1951). 
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Volpe and Peabody had diverging methods for dealing with the 
death penalty. During his 1960 campaign for governor, Volpe repeat-
edly said he believed the question of what to do about capital pun-
ishment was a matter for the legislature. "I don't believe the governor 
should have any more right to determine the outcome of the decision 
as to whether or not the death penalty should be abolished than any 
other citizen," he said whenever asked about his position on the topic. 
Volpe added, however, that unlike the hard-liners, he was not con-
vinced that capital punishment was a deterrent. Acting on the advice 
of his old friend and executive legal counsel, G. Joseph Tauro, Volpe's 
strategy was to delay in the hope that the electorate or the legislature 
would resolve the issue. In the meantime, when a defendant ex-
hausted his appeals, Volpe granted the condemned man a ninety-day 
"respite" so that his case might be re-studied. Tauro's legal assistant 
James O'Leary negotiated delays and reprieves with the Executive 
Council, juggling one then another. By early 1966 there were eight 
men on death row. However, in 1969, Volpe left the governor's office 
for an appointment in the Nixon administration having never wielded 
the state's ultimate power.l09 
Because of Volpe's strong performance during his first term, 
many Democrats believed his reelection campaign in 1962 was all but 
certain. Many wrote off Chub Peabody's challenge as the "last hurrah" 
of the old-stock Yankees. Volpe was a hard-working son of immigrants, 
a self-made man, who counted Cardinal Richard Cushing as a per-
sonal friend. Volpe also had painted the Democrats with the brush of 
political corruption. Peabody, a Yankee by birth, the son of an Epis-
copal bishop, and an All-American football player at Harvard, had 
served on the Governor's Council from 1954 to 1958, but was consid-
ered too liberal to be elected. However, Volpe coasted along while 
Peabody campaigned hard, calling for a graduated income tax, consti-
tutional reform, and an end to the death penalty. As a result, Peabody 
not only carried the traditional Democratic urban strongholds but ran 
well in the suburbs. He also benefited from the larger than usual 
number of voters who turned out to send young Ted Kennedy to the 
109 BOSTON HERALD TRAVELER, Sept. 3, 1960. For Peabody's comment about the Bos-
ton Strangler, see BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1963. For Volpe's announcement that he would 
enforce the death penalty, see BOSTON GLOBE, June 6, 1965; BOSTON REc.-AM., Feb. 4, 
1965. Following G. Joseph Tauro's appointment to the Superior Court in 1961, his son, 
Joseph L. Tauro, assumed the position of legal counsel to Governor Volpe. For the Volpe-
Tauro delaying strategy, see BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20,1969. For information on the number 
of people on death row in 1966, see BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1966. 
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U. S. Senate. Peabody squeaked into the statehouse, setting the stage 
for a tumultuous two-year debate about capital punishment. no 
For hopeful MCADP members and abolitionists generally, Gov-
ernor Peabody's initial step toward ending the death penalty hardly 
seemed promising. Despite their inauspicious beginning because of a 
quarrel over House leadership, Speaker John "Iron Duke" Thompson 
and Governor Peabody became allies in drafting an abolition bill. In 
letter~ and meetings, Ehrmann and the Governor's legislative aides 
sketched out a "plan of action." On January 30, 1963, the Governor 
publicly introduced his bill to end capital punishment in Massachu-
setts. Although he spoke in his signature wooden style, his an-
nouncement turned out to be explosive-even more explosive than it 
should have been-because the Governor gratuitously added three 
more charges to his bombshell. First, Peabody stated he had recom-
mended commuting to life imprisonment the death sentence of John 
Kerrigan, a convicted "cop killer." Second, he declared he intended to 
recommend clemency for all convicted murderers sentenced to 
death; and, finally, in response to a reporter's question, the Governor 
stated he would not sign a death warrant for the "Boston Strangler" if 
and when he was caught and convicted.11l 
John Joseph Kerrigan had been sentenced to death September 
24, 1961 for the fatal shooting of Cambridge patrolman Lawrence W. 
Gorman. According to testimony at trial, Kerrigan and an accomplice, 
Edgar Cook, were trying to break into a Kendall Square restaurant in 
the early morning of September 3, 1960, when Officer Gorman sur-
prised them. As they ran from the scene, Kerrigan fired three shots, 
110 BARBROOK, supra note I, at 135-38. 
m CORNELIUS DALTON ET AL., LEADING THE WAY: A HISTORY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
GENERAL COURT, 1629-1980, at 339-41 (1984); BOSTON GLoBE,Jan. 31,1963; Letter from 
Sara Ehrmann to Lester Hyman, Aide to Governor Peabody, Jan. 21, 1963, Box 18, Folder 
88; Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Endicott Peabody, Jan. 21,1963, Box 18, Folder 88; Let-
ter from James Lawton, Peabody Legislative Secretary, to Sara Ehrmann, Jan. 25, 1963, Box 
18, Folder 88, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. State Senator Philip Graham argued that the 
Governor's promise to commute all death sentences violated his oath of office because he 
was prejudging cases before the defendants committed the crimes. BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 
1, 1963. The Berkshire Eagle, downplayed "easterners" alarm at the Governor's "Strangler 
statement," noting that "westerners admire his courage, his image of 'damn the torpedoes' 
honesty." BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Mar. 1, 1963. From 1962 to 1964, thirteen single women in 
greater Boston were murdered by an assailant the press labeled the "Boston Strangler." See 
generally GERALD FRANK, THE BOSTON STRANGLER (1966). Albert de Salvo confessed to the 
murders and was sentenced to life imprisonment on a series of earlier charges. See generally 
id. Another inmate stabbed him to death in 1973. See generaUy id. 
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one of which struck Gorman in the back. l12 After deliberating just 
eighty minutes, a jury found Kerrigan guilty of murder in the first de-
gree. Judge Fairhurst sentenced Kerrigan to die in the electric chair, 
but stayed the sentence pending appeal. When the clerk asked Kerri-
gan if he had anything to say, he stood silent for a moment and then 
said, "I wasn't on Kendall Square that day. "113 
On the same day the SJC heard Kerrigan's arguments for a new 
trial, February 4, 1963, the Massachusetts Police Chiefs' Association 
mailed a letter to every legislator urging them to vote down Governor 
Peabody's call for abolition of the death penalty. The MCADP also 
began its lobbying effort. Six weeks later, James Lawton, Governor 
Peabody's legislative secretary, appeared before the Judiciary Com-
mittee to launch the Governor's abolition bill. "Surely no piece of leg-
islation to be considered by the General Court this year," Lawton be-
gan, ''will evoke more violent or emotional reaction than the matter of 
capital punishment we consider today." He hoped, however, the 
Committee might avoid the usual "confused excitement" by focusing 
on the "relative merits of the law as it now stands." Having paid lip 
service to the benefits of rational discourse, Lawton then bluntly and 
threateningly laid out the Governor's position. First, murderers "do 
not stop to consider the legal consequences before committing mur-
der." Second, Lawton noted that states without the death penalty had 
not experienced an increase in the number of murders. Third, he ar-
gued that the capital justice system can and had made mistakes. Fi-
nally, Lawton made it clear that if the legislature did not abolish capi-
tal punishment, the Governor would use his power to commute the 
death sentence of a convicted murderers during his term.1l4 
By early April 1963, the Massachusetts House and Senate debated 
several slightly different versions of an abolition bill. On April 18, the 
Senate passed a bill that abolished the death penalty for all convicted 
first-degree murderers except for someone serving a life sentence 
who killed a prison guard or for an imprisoned felon who in the 
course of an escape killed a guard. One week later, at the weary con-
clusion of an all night session, Ehrmann watched from the gallery as 
the House passed a similar bill. Speaker Thompson warned that a 
112 Commonwealth v. Kerrigan, 188 N.E.2d 484, 484-85 (Mass. 1963); BoSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 14, 1961. 
113 BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1961. 
114 BoSTON REc.-AM., Feb. 4, 1963. For Lawton's statement to Judiciary Committee, see 
James Lawton Statement, March 21,1963, Box 18, Folder 88, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 
9. 
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celebration was premature; parliamentary procedure required the 
House and Senate to take enactment votes. On Friday morning, May 
4, Governor Peabody and Speaker Thompson convened a meeting of 
abolitionists at the Parker House to map strategy and to count House 
members for Monday's showdown vote. Because he was suffering from 
a badly infected knee caused by wartime shrapnel, Thompson was 
confined to a wheelchair. For that reason, he telephoned House 
members rather than roam the House corridors in search of votes. 
Governor Peabody used his influence as well, and publicly vowed "a 
last-ditch fight" to enact a bill. At the same time, police officers 
knocked on legislators' office doors, urging them to hold firm against 
abolition. When the House vote was tabulated, the abolition bill lost 
by twelve votes.1l5 
Peabody's legislative aides brought him the bad news. The Gov-
ernor walked down to Speaker Thompson's office and thanked him 
for his effort. Thompson later issued a statement saying that although 
the Governor lost the fight for abolition, he "proved to those who 
were with him that he doesn't quit on them." Peabody vowed "the 
fight will go on." Not everyone believed him. The Boston Post-Gazette, 
for example, predicted the Governor would run away from abolition 
"as fast as his All-American feet can carry him." In fact, Peabody 
stayed the course; after John Kerrigan lost his SJC appeal, the Gover-
nor bucked public opinion once again and pressured the Council to 
commute Kerrigan's death sentence to life imprisonment.1I6 
In the winter of 1963, in the wake of President John F. Kennedy's 
assassination, Peabody altered his abolitionist rhetoric, trying to make 
his position more politically palatable. His opposition to capital pun-
ishment had not wavered, he told the Springfield Union, but people 
should understand he had a constitutional responsibility to carefully 
study the facts and consult with the Council about commuting a con-
115 For the Senate's bill, see LOWEll. SUN, Apr. 18, 1963. For initial House debate, see 
SPRINGFIELD UNION, Apr. 26,1963. For the Parker House meeting, see BOSTON HERALD, 
May 4,1963. The Boston Advertiser reported that the Governor's advisors urged him to drop 
the issue, but Ehrmann insisted the fight go on. BOSTON ADVERTISER, May 5, 1963. Her-
bert Ehrmann blamed the police lobby for the bill's failure. Herbert Ehrmann, Speech, 
Box 40, Folder 16, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
116 BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 1963; BOSTON POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 9, 1963; MEDFORD MER-
CURY, May 7, 1963. See generally Kerrigan, 188 N.E.2d 484. Early in September, a Medford 
man killed a police officer, and the wave of outrage caused the Council to vote six to three 
against Kerrigan's commutation. BOSTON REc.-AM., Nov. 8, 1963; WORCESTER 'IELEGRAM & 
GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 1963. As a result of Furman, Kerrigan was resentenced to life impris-
onment. Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 845 (1972). See generally Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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victed murderer's death sentence. He also emphasized that no gover-
nor since 1947-Democrat or Republican-had signed a death war-
rant. Despite Peabody's softer rhetoric, Ehrmann was certain the 
Governor's controversial position on capital punishment would be the 
most important campaign issue in November's gubernatorial race 
against Republican John Volpe, who sought to regain the office he 
lost in 1962. 
In an unprecedented turn of events, Lieutenant Governor Fran-
cis Bellotti defeated Peabody in the Democratic primary. Both Bellotti 
and Volpe opposed the death penalty, but voters did not perceive ei-
ther as a zealous abolitionist. The candidates differed over whether to 
impose a sales tax, but whispers about Bellotti's alleged Mafia ties 
probably made the difference. Although Democrat Lyndon Johnson 
swept to a huge victory over Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964, in 
an election that brought nearly 2.4 million Commonwealth voters to 
the polls, Volpe edged out Bellotti by 23,000 votes.1l7 
D. Charles Tracy Challenges Governar Volpe's &solve 
Mter taking office in January 1965, Volpe took two public steps 
intended to push the issue of capital punishment off the front page. 
First, he announced he would not stand in the way of an execution 
ordered by the court; and, second, about a year later, he abruptly 
fired Commissioner of Corrections George F. McGrath. McGrath was 
an Irish-American who had worked his way up from the streets of 
South Boston. Governor Furcolo appointed him Commissioner of 
Corrections, an appointment extended by Peabody and briefly by 
Volpe. Just one year into his new term, however, Volpe dismissed 
McGrath because his outspoken stand against capital punishment did 
not comport with the Governor's sought-after low profile on this is-
sue.us 
On the eve of McGrath's dismissal, the Boston Travelerpointed out 
that although a bill to abolish the death penalty had lost by a. scant 
117 For Peabody's softer abolitionist position, see SPRINGFIELD UNION, Dec. 2, 1963. 
During the Democrat primary, Bellotti often raised the question of capital punishment. 
See, e.g., SPRINGFIELD UNION, Apr. 20, 1964. Ehrmann feared that Bellotti would make 
Peabody's opposition to the death penalty the central issue; however, in fact, Bellotti's 
position was very similar to Peabody'S. Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Honorable Edward]. 
McCormack Jr., May 11,1964, Box 18, Folder 39, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. For elec-
tion results, see BARBROOK, supra note 1, at 140-43. 
118 BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1965; BOSTON REc.-AM., Feb. 25, 1965. McGrath was ap-
pointed Commissioner of Corrections for New York City. N.V. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1966. 
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margin two years prior, "today even abolitionists concede such a bill is 
dead." At the same time, Volpe worked to defuse the death penalty 
issue. He encouraged adroit legal maneuvering to prevent the eight 
convicted murderers on death row from being executed, and he pres-
sured the legislature to pass a death penalty moratorium while a 
commission determined if the death penalty was a deterrent to mur-
der.1l9 
Charles Tracy, a "convicted cop killer," tested Volpe's resolve. In 
the early morning of May 25, 1962, Tracy, an Mrican-American short-
order cook, entered the basement of the Kenmore Square office of 
the National Shawmut Bank of Boston and set off an alarm. Boston 
police responded to the call. The officers proceeded to the basement, 
which was a maze of small rooms connected by two narrow corridors. 
The officers spread out and slowly searched the area. One shot rang 
out, followed by three more shots in rapid succession. Mter running 
towards the shots, the officers reached an opening to a supply room 
where they saw Officer John J. Gallagher lying wounded on the floor. 
When his fellow officers tried to reach Gallagher, they came under 
fire from a "light-skinned, colored male"120 who was standing wedged 
between two metal lockers in the supply room. One of the officers 
shouted, "I am Sergeant Barry of the Boston Police. Put your gun out. 
Give yourself up. We are only interested in the wounded officer. "121 
Tracy did not respond. Whenever the police officers tried to reach 
Gallagher they came under fire. Nearly two hours passed before po-
lice officers were able to subdue Tracy and rescue their comrade. 
Officer Gallagher died at approximately 6 a.m.122 
At each of his two trials-the first ended in a hung jury-Tracy 
took the stand. He testified he did not remember entering the bank, 
but he did recall squeezing into a locker where he found a loaded re-
volver and gun belt. At the instant he emerged from the locker, Galla-
gher called out to drop the gun. Officer Gallagher, according to 
Tracy, then fired a shot hitting him in the wrist, causing a reflexive 
movement that discharged a bullet. Tracy also said he could not let go 
119 BOSTON GLOBE,june 6, 1965; BOSTON TRAVELER, Feb. 17, 1965. The eight prisoners 
on death row included Charles Tracy, john Kerrigan, Ronaldjackson, Peter Ladetto,jack 
Harris, Paul Smith, George McLaughlin, and Ronald Fisher. BOSTON REc.-AM., june 30, 
1972. A moratorium failed to pass in july, but Volpe managed to win acceptance of the 
measure in 1967. BOSTON TRAVELER, Aug. 8, 1967. 
120 Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Mass. 1965). 
121 Id. at 19. 
122 Id. at 17-19. 
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of the gun, and he did not hear Sergeant Barry call to him to throw 
the gun down. Finally, Tracy testified that before he arrived at the 
bank, he drank a grape-colored soft drink someone at his workplace 
gave to him, causing him to become "numb" and "blank." The first 
jury, in May 1963, could not agree on a verdict; however, seven 
months later, in an atmosphere charged by the assassination of Presi-
dent john F. Kennedy, the jury found Tracy guilty of murder in the 
first degree. Because the jury did not recommend mercy, the trial 
judge sentenced him to death. The SjC upheld the verdict by a split 
decision, and the Supreme Court declined to accept the case for re-
view. 123 
Prior to Tracy's trial and the imposition of his death sentence, 
capital punishment and race had not been explicitly linked either as 
part of a national abolitionist campaign or by the MCADP. Neither 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), nor its legal arm, the Legal Defense Fund (LDF), nor the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had taken a direct stand 
against capital punishment or launched a litigation campaign before 
1963. In that year, justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a memorandum 
in advance of the conference at which the Court would decide 
whether to hear Rudolph v. Alabama.124 Rudolph was a black man con-
victed and sentenced to death for the rape of a white woman. Al-
though Goldberg did not specifically question the constitutionality of 
the death penalty and was silent on the issue of race, his published 
dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari changed the legal land-
scape.125 It stimulated the LDF and the ACLU to make a commitment 
to an anti-capital punishment campaign and explicitly make the link 
with race.126 
In Boston, however, as in many other American cities at this time, 
the focus of African-Americans and of civil rights groups was school 
desegregation, not capital punishment. In june 1963, the Boston 
branch of the NAACP led a one-day school boycott and in early 1965 
filed suit in federal court against the Boston School Committee on 
123 [d. at 21, 23. A majority of the court rejected Tracy's argument that the incriminat-
ing statements he made when interrogated by a police officer as he lay wounded at the 
hospital violated his constitutional right to remain silent and to an attorney as stated by the 
Supreme Court. See id. at 22-23. See generally Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
124 See generally Rudolph v. State, 152 So. 2d 662 (Ala. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 889 
(1963) . 
125 See IAN GRAY & MOIRA STANLEY, A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME 330-31 
(1989) . 
126 [d. 
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the grounds that African-American children were being denied equal 
protection under the Constitution. The issues of desegregation and 
capital punishment did cross in the spring of 1965. Just four days after 
Martin Luther King, Jr. led a march from Roxbury to Boston Com-
mon to dramatize the issue of school desegregation, a divided SJC 
upheld Tracy's death sentence. For the next decade and a half, issues 
of race dominated Boston politics as well as the legal struggle to end 
capital punishment in Massachusetts and throughout the United 
States.127 
In September 1966, Tracy filed a petition asking Governor Volpe 
to commute his sentence to life imprisonment. Tracy's appeal first 
went to the Parole Board, chaired by Joseph F. McCormack.l28 A 
Democrat publicly opposed to capital punishment, McCormack 
figured Tracy would be best served by delaying a decision rather than 
forcing Governor Volpe to tackle Tracy's commutation request a few 
weeks before the gubernatorial election, as some Democrats wanted. 
McCormack feared politicizing the case would jeopardize Tracy's 
chances of winning the Executive Council's favorable recommenda-
tion. 
Not all Democrats or Parole Board members agreed with 
McCormack's strategy. Hoping to convince the Board to push Volpe 
onto a the political tightrope, George Cronin Jr., a Democrat member 
of the Executive Council, publicly argued that since Volpe sought the 
power to make life and death decisions, he must act now. Board 
member John T. Lane also urged McCormack to get Tracy's case to 
Volpe as soon as possible. Lane, the only African-American on the 
Board, wanted Volpe to confront the racial bias of capital punish-
ment. Speaking for the growing number of Boston blacks demanding 
full civil rights, Lane asserted that racial bias prompted Tracy's sen-
tence as well as the effort to postpone Tracy's hearing. In the end, 
McCormack prevailed, and Tracy's case was not forwarded to Volpe 
until after he won a new four-year term.129 
127 See generally Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1965); RONALD P. FOR-
MISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING (1991). For King's visit, see BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 
1965. 
128 The Parole Board's function was to hold a hearing on a commutation petition and 
then to make a recommendation to the Governor. If the Board's recommendation was in 
favor of commutation, the Governor might then submit the issue to the Executive Council. 
Mter a hearing, the Council made a recommendation to the Governor who then made the 
final decision. 
129 BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 24, 1966. Between 1950 and 1960, Boston lost about 100,000 
white people and gained 25,000 black people. ALAN Lupo, LIBERTY'S CHOSEN HOME 135, 
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In the waning days before Tracy's scheduled execution, during 
the week beginning December 14, 1966, the Boston Globe, among 
other newspapers, weighed in against the execution. There "is a sub-
stantial possibility that Tracy is NOT guilty of first degree murder. "130 
Quoting liberally from Justice Arthur E. Whittemore's SJC dissent, the 
Globe argued against the majority's conclusion that Tracy had commit-
ted premeditated murder.131 Tracy entered the bank without tools or a 
weapon, and he shot Officer Gallagher in the presence of other po-
lice officers, a "foolhardy act," not a planned, thoughtful act. Tracy's 
story that he drank a strange concoction and became "numb" "reads 
like a cock and bull story," but it must be read with the "officer's tes-
timony and with the testimony of other witnesses" who said that Tracy 
"looked, acted and talked 'funny'" before he walked into the bank.132 
The Globe also agreed with the portion of Justice Whittemore's dissent 
that determined the police interrogation deprived Tracy of his consti-
tutional rights. For the state to invoke the death penalty against a man 
who, "may not be guilty of first degree murder and is not even a hard-
ened criminal would be vicious beyond description. It would also have 
the most grievous consequences for the reputation of Massachusetts 
in the nation and the world," the Globe concluded with an eye on the 
global impact of the civil rights struggle.133 
The MCADP and a substantial number of Boston College (BC) 
faculty also petitioned Governor Volpe, asking that he and the Execu-
tive Council commute Tracy's death sentence. Prompted by Ehrmann, 
attorney John G.S. Flym, of Foley, Hoag and Eliot, sent an "urgent" 
circular letter to Boston-area lawyers asking for their support in the 
campaign to save Tracy. Two days later, at 9 a.m. on December 7, Fa-
ther William Kenealy, SJ., a former dean and then BC Law School 
professor, personally carried a petition signed by eighty-five BC and 
BC Law School faculty members to Governor Volpe asking him to "ex-
tend executive clemency to Charles E. Tracy." "With profound sorrow 
and heartfelt sympathy with the family, the friends, and the colleagues 
of Officer John J. Gallagher," the BC faculty began, "we believe that 
the commutation of this death sentence will prevent the compound-
147 (1978). Volpe easily defeated Democrat Edward McCormack to win the first four-year 
term for governor in Massachusetts history. BARBROOK, supra note 1, at 152-53. 
130 BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 1966. 
131 See Tracy, 207 N.E.2d at 24-25 (Whittemore,J., dissenting). 
132Id. (Whittemore,J., dissenting). 
133 Id. (Whittemore, J., dissenting); BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 1966; see also BEVERLY 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1966. 
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ing of private and personal tragedy, and promote the public interest 
of the Commonwealth." Like the Globe, the BC faculty sided with Jus-
tice Whittemore in finding Tracy's "conduct in this tragedy was un-
planned, bewildered, impulsive and irrational, rather than conduct 
inspired by 'deliberately premeditated malice afore-thought. "'134 The 
signers were "appalled" by the omission of this important and critical 
reference in the trial judge's charge to the jury. Father Kenealy and 
the others insisted this "critical omission in the charge to the jury 
constitutes a clear challenge to the conscience of the Executive De-
partment to exercise that merciful clemency which, in our benign ju-
risprudence, is available to mitigate in particular instances the unfore-
seen horror of sheer legality. "135 
Volpe acted the day after receiving the BC petition. On the Gov-
ernor's recommendation, the Executive Council voted six to two for a 
six-month respite for Tracy. Volpe told the Council he intended to file 
a bill in the next legislature calling for a death penalty moratorium so 
that a commission might determine whether capital punishment de-
terred murder. Allowing Tracy to die before the legislature acts, Volpe 
declared, would be unfair to Tracy since others on death row would 
benefit if the legislature instituted a moratorium. The Governor 
added the usual political caveat: He had not changed his position on 
the death penalty. "I see it as my clear duty," he said at his weekly news 
conference on December 8, 1966, "to enforce the laws of the com-
monwealth, including the death penalty, as they presently exist in as 
fair and impartial manner as is humanly possible."136 
In the spring, Volpe threw the political hot potato of capital pun-
ishment to the legislature. He asked for a special study commission to 
determine if the death penalty was a deterrent. The House killed 
Volpe's bill by nine votes, largely in reaction to the Boston Strangler's 
escape from the state's hospital for the criminally insane. Volpe made 
some minor changes and then refiled the bill, but it failed by an even 
larger margin the second time. On the third attempt in August, 
Volpe's staff used every weapon in the Governor's arsenal, including a 
welcome statement from Cardinal Richard Cushing. For the first time 
since he assumed control of the archdiocese in 1945, the crusty, popu-
lar spiritual leader of Boston's Roman Catholic population revealed 
1M Tracy, 207 N.E.2d at 25. 
m Petition for Charles E. Tracy from the Boston College Faculty, to Governor Volpe 
(Dec. 5, 1966) Box 27, Folder 65, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 8, 
1967. 
136 BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1966. 
334 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:281 
that he did not believe capital punishment was a deterrent and that 
he personally regretted capital punishment was the law of the Com-
monwealth. The bill sailed through the legislature. Although the 
MCADP opposed it, a referendum on capital punishment was also 
planned for 1968.137 
On the eve of the scheduled 1968 referendum, following her 
thirty-eighth consecutive appearance before the Joint Judiciary Com-
mittee of the legislature, Sara Ehrmann stepped down as president of 
the MCADP and of the AlACP. "No matter how anyone feels about 
capital punishment," wrote Charles W. Bartlett, President of the Bos-
ton Bar Association, "he can't have anything but admiration for the 
one-woman crusade that Mrs. Ehrmann has put on over the years." 
Bartlett noted that although Ehrmann had garnered plenty of help 
over the years, it was Ehrmann who "rounded up the speakers for the 
hearings, sent out the appeals for funds and generally rallied anyone 
and everyone who might conceivably assist." Bartlett concluded that 
the MCADP and the AlACP are "high sounding names but pretty 
largely no more nor less than Sara Ehrmann." When, four years after 
her "retirement," the Supreme Court held capital punishment as then 
practiced unconstitutional, Ehrmann told the Boston Record-American, 
"I feel victorious. 1 appreciate every ounce of success. 1 feel trium-
phant. Yes, 1 feel triumphant. "138 
157 BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 8, 1967. Cushing's statement appeared originally in TIu! Men-
trn; A Pmal Publication and was reprinted by the MCADP along with an interview. Cushing, 
supra note 105; MCADP reprints, Box 37, Folder 2, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. MCADP 
had long opposed a popular referendum on the question of capital punishment. See, e.g., 
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1957; Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Attorney 
General Edward McCormack, Mar. 18, 1959, Box 4, Folder 71, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 
9. The MCADP consistently opposed a public referendum on the issue of capital punish-
ment, believing that voters were too likely to be swayed by emotion rather than reason. 
SPRINGFIELD UNION, Dec. 10, 1957; Letter from Vivian Pierce to Sara Ehrmann, May 5, 
1931, Box 18, Folder 96, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter from Edward McCormack 
to Sara Ehrmann, May 18, 1959, Box 4, Folder 71, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9; Letter 
from Sara Ehrmann to Summer Kaplan,July 27,1961, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9 
138 Charles W. Bartlett, The Presidmt's Page, 11 BOSTON B. J. 1,3-4 (Feb. 1967). After 
her "retirement," Ehrmann remained active in the Friends of Prisoners and the Norfolk 
Lifer's Group until 1988. BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1993. Sara Ehrmann died March 17, 
1993 at the age ofninety-5even. BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1993. The MCADP's office, at 14 
Pearl Street, Brookline, was demolished as part of an urban renewal project in 1968. David 
Skerry, a Boston College Law School student, worked with Ehrmann in the summer of 
1967 to sort through her vast anti-capital punishment collection. She initially thought her 
collection might be housed at Boston College Law School, but that plan fell through. The 
collection went to Northeastern University Law School; after several years the collection 
was moved to Northeastern University. See BOSTON REc.-AM., June 30, 1972; Letter from 
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E. New Voices and a March Towards Court 
The Court's Furman decision signaled what Ehrmann herself had 
predicted some years earlier: A shift in the abolitionists' focus away 
from an effort to enact legislation and toward a focus on the "inade-
quacies of the law and procedure. "139 For this reason, new faces and 
tactics dominated the abolitionist effort after 1968. Attorney William 
Homans, Jr. and Harvard Law School professor Laurence H. Tribe 
were among those lawyers acting in cooperation with the Massachu-
setts Civil Liberties Union to pursue abolition in the courts. Likewise, 
Tufts University philosophy professor Hugh A. Bedau revived the 
AIACP and produced scores of scholarly publications focusing on the 
death penalty'S legal and social inequities. In addition, Boston Uni-
versity President John Silber, once active in the Texas abolitionist 
movement, assumed responsibility for educating the public.140 
Despite Ehrmann's tireless effort and the infusion of new blood 
into the abolitionist movement, the results of the death penalty refer-
endum in 1968 presented a huge-but not unexpected-disappoint-
ment. "Shall the commonwealth of Massachusetts retain capital pun-
ishment for crime," the plebiscite asked voters. There were a total of 
1,159,348 ''yes'' votes, 730,649 "no" votes, and 458,008 blanks. HI Of 
351 Massachusetts' cities, only twelve voted negatively. Within a month 
after voters expressed their preference for capital punishment, Volpe 
left the governor's office for a position as President Richard Nixon's 
Secretary of Transportation. Lieutenant Governor Francis W. Sargent 
served as acting governor before winning a full four-year term in 
1970. An affable, lanky, lanternjawed, low-key Yankee from Cape Cod, 
David P. Skerry to Sara Ehrmann, Sept. 17, 1967, Box 19, Folder 44, Ehrmann Papers, 
supra note 9. 
139 Letter from Sara Ehrmann to Charles Sprague,June 19, 1951, Box 19, Folder 47, 
Ehrmann Papers, supra note 9. 
140 Following passage of the mercy bill in 1951, Ehrmann predicted that lawyers 
"themselves will come to demand abolition of capital punishment." Letter from Sara Ehr-
mann to Charles Sprague, June 19, 1951, Box 19, Folder 47, Ehrmann Papers, supra note 
9. According to a letter sent to all MCADP members in June 1971, Tribe and Silber 
testified before the Judiciary Committee in 1970 and 1971. In the same letter, the new 
president of MCADP also reported that John Flackett, Boston College Law School profes-
sor, and Frank Heffron, formerly with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, had met with Gov-
ernor Sargent to work out ways to extend the respites due to expire for four men on death 
row. Letter from Louis L. Brin, President of the MCADP, to Members,June 1971, Ehrmann 
Papers, supra note 9. For a list of Bedau's publications on the death penalty, see THE 
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 474-75. 
141 JOHN FX. DAVOREN, ELECTIONS STATISTICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHU-
SE'ITS 400 (1968). 
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Sargent had made his name as an environmentalist and as head of the 
Department of Public Works. Before 1970 he said nothing publicly 
about the death penalty, but during his campaign for governor, Sar-
gent made it clear he opposed capital punishment. Despite his stated 
opposition, Sargent tacked on the caveat that he would sign a bill al-
lowing the death penalty for those who murder law enforcement 
officers.142 
The shooting death of Officer Walter A. Schroeder in September 
1970 prompted Sargent's remark. Police charged William "Lefty" 
Gilday with first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery 
stemming from the September 23, 1970 robbery of the State Street 
Bank in Brighton. The State also indicted Stanley R. Bond, Robert J. 
Valeri, Susan E. Saxe, and Katherine A. Power. Valeri, Saxe, and Bond, 
all armed, entered the bank while Gilday, armed with a semiautomatic 
rifle, remained in a car parked outside the bank to protect the trio 
during their getaway. Power waited nearby in a "switch" car. The three 
robbers left the bank with more than $23,000 and sped off in the 
getaway car. At that moment, Officer Schroeder arrived on the scene. 
From across the street, Gilday began shooting at Schroeder, fatally 
wounding the officer. All five members of the gang made their way to 
Bond's Beacon Street apartment where, according to a witness, Saxe 
and Power accused Gilday of being "trigger happy." Valeri, captured 
by police within hours, confessed, sending the others running. Gilday 
fled from Boston, driving to several Massachusetts cities before forc-
ing his way into a Haverhill home and holding a family hostage for 
nearly twenty-four hours. At gunpoint, he forced two family members 
to drive him to Worcester, where police later arrested him.143 
Gilday and Valeri met while serving time in Walpole State Prison. 
Bond was the third male member of the "Revolutionary Action 
Force-East," as the gang styled itself. Because of their success in a 
program designed to help inmates further their education, the state 
paroled Valeri, Bond, and Gilday. Valeri and Gilday then enrolled at 
Northeastern University, and Bond began attending Brandeis, where 
he met Susan Saxe and Kathy Power.144 
142 ld. at 400-06; BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1965. For Sargent's 1970 campaign state-
ment, see BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1973. 
143 Commonwealth v. Gilday, 327 N.E.2d 851, 853, 854, 856 (Mass. 1975); BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1972; BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 1972; BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1972. 
144 Gilday, 327 N.E.2d at 856-57; BOSTON HERALD TRAVELER, May 24,1972. At Walpole 
State Prison, Bond killed himself when a bomb he was making exploded. BOSTON HERALD, 
May 24, 1972. 
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Fervently opposed to the Vietnam War, Power joined the Bran-
deis Sanctuary Community and helped organize a refuge for an 
AWOL army private in 1968. As the war escalated, Power abandoned 
her non-violent beliefs. In May 1970, when National Guard troops 
killed four Kent State students, Bond, Power, and Saxe helped organ-
ize the National Strike Information Center at Brandeis, a group which 
promoted student strikes nationwide. When the Strike Information 
Cente.r needed money, Bond, Power, and Saxe robbed banks in Illi-
nois, Pennsylvania, and California. After the Brighton murder, Bond, 
Saxe, and Power split up. Police captured Bond in a Colorado motel 
several days later. Police finally arrested Saxe in Philadelphia in 1975, 
and Power turned herself in to authorities in 1993. Justice Edward F. 
Hennessey labeled the entire episode "an odyssey of violence against 
the background of political revolution, or at least pretensions of revo-
lution. "145 
After pleading guilty to manslaughter in his own trial, Valeri 
testified for the prosecution in Gilday's trial. A jury convicted Gilday 
of first-degree murder and robbery, and sentenced him to death on 
March 10, 1972. He joined twenty-three other men in Walpole Prison 
awaiting execution. When the Supreme Court held in 1972 that Wil-
liam Furman's death sentence was "cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments," the Court re-
versed the judgment in his case and remanded it for further proceed-
ings, namely, resentencing to life imprisonment. In a series of per cu-
riam decisions, the Court also ordered resentencing in 118 other 
cases from twenty-six different states. l46 One of the cases the Court 
summarily reversed was the death sentence of John S. Stewart, who 
had murdered a Boston policeman in 1971. Three other Massachu-
setts death sentences pending at the Court were also reversed. All but 
two of the remaining twenty cases would eventually claim a reversal on 
the grounds of Furman and Stewart.147 However, dicta in Justice Stew-
art's concurring opinion in Furman suggested that Massachusetts' 
145 Gilday, 327 N.E.2d at 854, 855; BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 1993. Saxe's first trial 
ended in a hung jury. She later pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a twelve to 
fourteen-year sentence. She was paroled in 1982. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993. For details on 
Power, see BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1993. 
146 See generally Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972). 
147 See generally Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 299 N.E.2d 719 (Mass. 1973). 
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mandatory death penalty for felony rape-murder might satisfy consti-
tutional requirements. l48 
III. THE FINAL PHASE: VICTORY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS COURTS 
A. Setting the Stage in the SJC 
While Furman gave abolitionists joy for what it delivered and for 
what it seemed to promise J lstice Stewart's dicta suggesting that 
mandatory death sentences for defendants convicted of rape-murder 
could be constitutional gave Massachusetts death penalty proponents 
reason to celebrate as well. For this reason, over the next decade and 
a half, the Massachusetts legislature, the governor, and the SJC waged 
an intense struggle to define the Commonwealth's post-Furman death 
penalty position. The SJC was the first branch of Massachusetts' gov-
ernment to react to the Court's abolition of the death penalty, fol-
lowed by the legislature, and then by Governor Frank Sargent. On 
July 23, 1973, by its ruling in Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, the SJC applied 
Furman to the death sentence convicts not mentioned in the Court's 
per curiam holding in Stewart. David LeBlanc had been sentenced to 
death in the winter of 1971 for the shotgun murder of his stepfather. 
In a unanimous opinion, the SJC decided that "in the light of the 
Furman case," LeBlanc's death sentence "may not remain. "149 The SJC 
ordered LeBlanc to be resentenced to life imprisonment.l5o 
Three weeks later, in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, the SJC ruled 
that teenaged Alphonso Pickney's death sentence for felony murder-
rape must be reversed. The court was receptive to defense counsel Bill 
Homans' argument. Homans argued that the statute allowed a trial 
judge unconstitutional discretionary authority and that Pickney's 
death sentence must be reversed.151 
148 Stewart, 408 U.S. at 845; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240, 307-08 (1972) 
(Stewart,]., concurring); Gilday, 327 N.E.2d at 853,856,866. See generally Commonwealth v. 
O'Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1975) (O'Neall); Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 300 N.E.2d 
439 (Mass. 1973). For Valeri's testimony, see BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1972. The Boston 
Record-American, reported that Gilday joined twenty-three men on "death row." BOSTON 
REc.-AM., June 30, 1972. Delaware and North Carolina struck down their state's mercy 
laws. See generally State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1972); State v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 
19 (N.C. 1973). 
149 LeBlanc, 299 N.E.2d at 726-27. 
150 Id. 
151 442 MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 61 (1973) (repealed 1996); Commonwealth v. AJu-
venile, 300 N.E.2d at 439-40; Supplemental Brieffor the Defendant at 5 (quoting Furman, 
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Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Paul C. Reardon agreed. 
In light of the Supreme Court's finding in Furman, the SJC held "that 
imposition of the death penalty [in Pickney's case] left as it was within 
the discretion of the judge, is invalid, and that the penalty is therefore 
limited to life imprisonment. "152 The court added, prophetically, that 
they did not have an opinion on the constitutionality of the law man-
dating a death sentence for adult perpetrators of murder-rape. In 
short, the fate of Mrican-Arnerican Robert O'Neal, whose February 
1973 conviction for murder-rape had led to a mandatory death sen-
tence, was yet to be decided.153 
The legislature did not share the SJC's interest in hearing argu-
ments against the mandatory death penalty provision. Well before the 
LeBlanc ruling, House members filed five different death penalty bills. 
In the spring, the Joint Judiciary Committee held a public hearing. 
Spokespersons for and against the death penalty gave emotional 
speeches, but none as grotesque as Representative George Sacco's (D-
Medford). Speaking in favor of his bill calling for a mandatory death 
penalty for the murder of a police or correctional officer, Sacco loudly 
and proudly proclaimed, "I believe in two chairs and no waiting." 
Early in August, the Joint Judiciary Committee reported out favorably 
a mandatory death penalty bill for all first-degree murder convictions, 
a proposal modeled on the state's pre-1951 statute. Mter vociferous 
and divisive debate, the House voted 130 to 89 in favor of the bill. 
Death penalty opponents slowed final enactment of the bill by asking 
the SJC for an advisory opinion about its constitutionality.154 
On September 25, 1973, Massachusetts Attorney General Robert 
H. Quinn filed his brief with the SJC. Prepared with the assistance of 
Harvard Law School professor Lloyd Weinreb and Bill Homans, 
Quinn's brief argued that the House bill violated the Massachusetts 
constitutional prohibition against "cruel or unusual punishment. "155 
The Attorney General defined "cruel" as "excessive in relation to the 
offense punished, no matter how heinous," an interpretation drawn 
408 u.s. at 309-10),6-8, Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 300 N.E.2d 439 (Mass. 1973) (on 
file at Massachusetts SJC Archives). 
152 Comrrwnwealth v. AJuvenile, 300 N.E.2d at 442. 
153 Id. at 439-40, 442. See generally O'Neal J, 327 N.E.2d 662. 
154 Request for Opinions from Supreme Judicial Court on Proposed House Bill No. 
7231; BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9,1973; BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1973. 
155 Within this article, the text adheres to the difference between the Massachusetts 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution with regard to limiting the scope of punishment; 
the former cites "cruel or unusual punishments " while the latter references "cruel and 
unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; MAss. CONST. Part I, art. 26. 
340 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:281 
from Trop v. Dulles, a 1958 Supreme Court case. A mandatory death 
penalty, Quinn claimed, demeans "the dignity of man" and causes the 
"total destruction of the individual's status in organized society," and 
therefore is "cruel." Taking a statement from Justice Brennan's con-
currence in Furman one step further, Quinn concluded that capital 
punishment "is not merely different in degree of severity but different 
in kind from every other penal sanction and therefore 'unusual' 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. "156 
As the legislative session drew to a close, the House grew too im-
patient to wait for the SJC's advisory opinion. On October 1, the 
House forged ahead and passed the mandatory death penalty bill by a 
vote of 143 to 82.157 Before the Senate could take up the bill, two es-
pecially brutal murders occurred in Boston. Gangs of Mrican-
American youths allegedly burned a young white woman to death in 
Roxbury, and assaulted and stabbed a white fisherman to death near 
Columbia Point. Riding this wave of emotion, the Senate passed a 
slightly different mandatory death penalty bill by a vote of twenty to 
eleven.158 Mter some haggling, a bill specifying the types of criminal 
homicide subject to a mandatory death sentence passed the Senate 
and the House just after Thanksgiving, 1973.159 
Just four days after the legislature passed the bill and three years 
almost to the day after "Lefty" Gilday gunned down his brother Wal-
ter, Detective John D. Schroeder was murdered while investigating a 
holdup. Amidst the ensuing storm of public outrage, opponents of 
capital punishment rallied to oppose the mandatory death penalty 
bill now sitting on Governor Sargent's desk. At a State House news 
conference, Boston University President John Silber solemnly ob-
served: 
It is difficult to control our instinct to avenge the cruel and 
senseless murder of detective Schroeder. Capital punishment 
cannot return to life detective Schroeder or any other victim. 
156 Request for an Advisory Opinion, Brief for Attorney General at 12, 14-16, Com-
monwealth v. AJuvenile, 300 N.E.2d 439 (Mass. 1973) (on file at Massachusetts SJC Ar-
chives); seeFurrnan, 408 U.S. at 28~7; Trop v. Dulles Secretary of State, 356 U.S. 86,100-
01 (1958). 
157 BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1973. 
156 BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5,1973. 
159 For the vote, see BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 1973. For the murders, see BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1973 and BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1973. For the House vote, see BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 26, 1973. 
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Tragically, the most we can do for those who are killed is to 
show our concern for the sanctity of life. 160 
341 
Silber also presented the Governor's secretary with a MCADP petition 
signed by 10,000 people urging Sargent to veto the bill. The following 
day the Massachusetts Police Chiefs Association countered with a let-
ter demanding the Governor sign the bill into law. On December 6, 
600 police officers, returning from Detective Schroeder's funeral, 
marched on the governor's office demanding an interview. Governor 
Sargent agreed to talk with a small delegation of the officers and dur-
ing an hour-long meeting punctuated by angry shouting, the police 
officers urged the Governor to sign the bill. 161 
The day before the bill would be automatically pocket-vetoed, 
Sargent told statehouse reporters of his intention. He wanted to help 
the "cops," he said, but he felt the death penalty was "imagined help." 
Sargent added, "I'm amazed at the number of people who think the 
electric chair would end violence. 1 really don't." The following day, 
December 10, the Governor issued a somewhat more formal press 
release outlining his reasons for vetoing the bill. Sargent acknowl-
edged that ''we live in times of alarming violence" and bowed to the 
tough job performed by the police, but he criticized the mandatory 
death penalty bill as being of "doubtful constitutionality." He also 
shared his "personal and moral compunctions about the taking of 
human life by the state" and articulated a political position that 
seemed to allow the Governor to appease both sides. "I will sign a 
capital punishment measure that is limited to killers of law enforce-
ment officers," the Governor stated forcibly, hastily adding that before 
signing such a bill he would "insist it be considered by our Supreme 
Court on the question of constitutionality. "162 
Governor Sargent's pocket veto drew criticism from capital pun-
ishment opponents and proponents. Opponents felt Sargent had 
"knuckled under" because he suggested he would sign some sort of 
death penalty bill. At the same time, the chairman of the Boston Po-
lice Patrolmen's Association decried the Governor's decision, labeling 
it "craven" and "politically motivated." Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
160 BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1973. On November 30, 1973, Terrell Walker murdered 
John Schroeder during a holdup of a Roxbury pawn shop murdered. BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
30,1973. 
161 The media reported the Police Chiefs' letter on the same day as Silber's comments. 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1973. For the Governor's meeting with 600 police officers, see 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1973. 
162 BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1973; BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1973. 
342 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:281 
abolition battle re-ignited in the spring of 1974. On March 5, the 
House passed the same death penalty bill the Governor had vetoed 
the preceding session. This time, however, the legislature figured 
there would be time to attempt to override Sargent's expected veto. 
The Senate also passed the mandatory death penalty bill, though by a 
narrow margin. As predicted, Governor Sargent vetoed the bill within 
hours after it reached his desk. The House quickly and easily overrode 
the veto, but the Senate fell one vote shy of the requisite two-thirds 
needed to override.I6s 
Capital punishment was a non-issue in the 1974 gubernatorial 
campaign since Sargent and eventual winner Democrat Michael Du-
kakis both opposed the death penalty. The youngest son of Greek 
parents, Dukakis graduated from Swarthmore College and Harvard 
Law School. Following admission to the bar in 1955 he practiced law, 
but his chief interest was politics. Elected to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in 1963, he earned a reputation as a "tough, honest maverick," a 
label he proudly wore when he took office as governor in January 
1975. Just four months later, under intense pressure from citizens an-
gry about rising crime and murder rates, the legislature tested Gover-
nor Dukakis' resolve on capital punishment. A bill mandating capital 
punishment in nine categories of murder landed on the Governor's 
desk April 29, 1975. He had already prepared a veto message. Dukakis 
told the legislature that he could not "reconcile the willful taking of a 
human life by the state with his own moral and ethical beliefs." He 
added that he had never seen "any convincing evidence that the 
death penalty is a deterrent to crime," and that he had "grave doubts 
about the constitutionality of the legislature's bill." Two days later the 
House voted 156 to 68 to override the governor's veto, but by a single 
vote the Senate failed to override the veto, briefly ending political de-
bate on the issue. The death penalty did become a hated and divisive 
campaign issue in 1988, but in the meantime, the spotlight shifted to 
the court.164 
165 BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1974; BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1974; BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
26, 1974; BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1974; BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1974; BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 15, 1973. 
164 BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1982. For Dukakis' veto, see BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1975. 
Senate President Kevin Harrington (D. Salem) cast the deciding vote against overriding 
Dukakis' veto. BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1975. During the 1988 presidential campaign, 
George Bush was critical of Dukakis' veto of death penalty legislation. 
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B. Robert 0 'Neal's Ground-Breaking Case 
On the morning of March 27, 1972, Robert O'Neal, a nineteen-
year-old Mrican American, forced his way into a Roxbury apartment 
occupied by Gladys Mercadel, a fifty-eight-year-old white woman and 
her thirty-four year old son, Earl. Once inside the apartment O'Neal 
drew a gun, grabbed Gladys' wrist and dragged her toward the rear of 
the apartment. Earl, who suffered from muscular dystrophy, lay help-
less in bed. About twenty minutes later, O'Neal returned to Earl's 
room and assaulted him, stabbing him in the neck and stomach with a 
kitchen knife. When the police arrived they found Earl lying in a pool 
of blood, seriously injured. Gladys Mercadel had been strangled to 
death. Her partially clothed body lay on her bed, with a wad of tissue 
stuffed in her mouth. There was evidence she had been raped before 
she had been murdered. A jury found O'Neal guilty of rape-murder. 
Before sentencing O'Neal to death, Judge Allan Dimond stated his 
belief that Furman "did not annul the Massachusetts statute that 
makes the death penalty mandatory for murder committed in the 
commission of rape." On appeal to the SJC, attorney Bill Homans 
took aim at this premise,165 
During this time, G. Joseph Tauro served as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Judicial Court. Born and educated in Lynn, Massachusetts, 
the son of an immigrant shoemaker, Tauro attended Boston Univer-
sity Law School and earned admission to the bar in 1927. He hung 
out a shingle in his hometown and slowly built a private practice, at-
tracting Volpe Construction as one of his clients. This representation 
developed into a professional and personal relationship that led 
Tauro to Beacon Hill in 1961, when he served as Governor Volpe's 
legal counsel. A short time later, Volpe appointed Tauro Chief Justice 
of the Superior Court, a position he held until Governor Sargent 
moved him to the SJC's center seat in 1970. The Boston Globe greeted 
Tauro's appointment to the SJC with derision. Tauro's "most distin-
guished feature in the legal world," the Globe wrote, "has been his 
pompous, self-important manner. He is also known for his vindictive 
attitude toward his critics." In case anyone missed the point, the Globe 
165 Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662, 663, 664 (Mass. 1975) (O'Neal I); Bos-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1973; BOSTON GLOBE, June 9, 1973. 
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added: "The state's highest court needs new blood, new talent, new 
thinking, new force. The Tauro appointment brings none of this. "166 
Almost immediately after taking his seat on the court, Chief Jus-
tice Tauro began to prove his critics wrong. In a heated dissent, he 
blasted the SJC's ancient policy of legislative deference. "I do not be-
lieve we should look to the legislature for change," he wrote. "To do 
so is a distortion of the concept of judicial review. "167 A year later, 
Chief Justice Tauro assaulted the court's "slavish adherence to stare 
decisis. "168 In criminal procedure, too, the Tauro court swept aside old 
rules and added new protections for the accused.169 
Chief Justice Tauro's drive for judicial independence thrust the 
SJC into the forefront of a post-Warren movement to supplement fed-
eral constitutional rights with an expanded interpretation of state 
constitutional guarantees. During the decade following the 1969 res-
ignation of Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, the SJC was 
"more outspoken concerning the significance of rights under the 
Declaration of Rights than at any time in its history," according to 
Herbert P. Wilkins, SJC Chief Justice from 1996 through 1999. Tauro's 
colleagues and successors publicly encouraged lawyers to make 
greater use of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and insisted 
that "'the duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial 
for his life rises above mere rules of procedure.'" For this reason, the 
SJC's bold and controversial decisions about capital punishment not 
only had deep roots within Massachusetts' law and culture, but were a 
manifestation of a new shift toward state constitutionalism as wellPo 
It was within this context, in April 1975, that Chief Justice Tauro 
spoke for a narrow, divided majority in O'NealL He rejected both of 
the defense's major arguments. Homans had argued the statute im-
166 Honorable C. joseph Tauro, 61 MASS. L. Q. 19, 19-22 (1976); BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 
1994 (noting, in Tauro's obituary, a quote from a 1970 Globe comment on his appoint-
ment). 
167 Lombardo v. D.F. Frangioso & Co., 269 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Mass. 1971). 
168 United Factory Outlet, Inc. v.Jay's Stores, Inc., 278 N.E.2d 716, 727 (Mass. 1972). 
169 jay's Stores, 278 N.E.2d at 727; D.F. Frangioso, 269 N.E.2d at 840. See generally Com-
monwealtlI v. Mutina, 323 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 1975); CommonwealtlI v. Cain, 279 N.E.2d 
706 (Mass. 1972). 
170 Justice William Brennan is credited witlI spurring the move to state constitutional-
ism. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,120 (1975) (Brennan,]., dissenting); Herbert P. 
Wilkins, judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provi-
sions ojthe United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 887,890 (1980). For Chief Jus-
tice Hennessey's comment encouraging lawyers to make greater use of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, see CommonwealtlI v. Harris, 358 N.E.2d 982, 988 (Mass. 1976) 
(quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,287 (1936» and BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1986. 
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posing a mandatory death penalty for rape-murder was unconstitu-
tional under Furman either because it allowed the jury to have discre-
tion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed, or 
because the death penalty itself was cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The discretion analysis "appears 
plausible at first glance," Chief Justice Tauro wrote, but "there are se-
rious problems connected with its use. "171 The majority noted that 
when a jury finds that a murder was committed in the course of a 
rape, the state automatically imposes the death penalty. Juries, "if 
properly charged, have no discretion to find mitigating circumstances 
or a lesser degree of culpability. "172 The SJC admitted that it is possi-
ble for a '"rogue''' jury to disregard evidence that a murder was com-
mitted in the course of a rape to avoid subjecting the defendant to the 
death penalty. However, the majority stated that if this possibility 
equals unconstitutional jury discretion, then "our entire criminal jury 
system." would be discredited.m 
Alternatively, Homans argued the death penalty violated the 
Eighth Amendment and Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. Although 
Chief Justice Tauro noted the immense quantity of judicial and schol-
arly literature on this issue, he ultimately found the material inconclu-
sive. Having rejected both of Homans' arguments, the SJC chose an-
other route. Specifically, the Chief Justice argued that the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-and he added in a footnote, 
the "fundamental constitutional principles enshrined in our State 
constitution dictate an identical result"-protected a fundamental 
right to life.174 "Life is a constitutionally protected fundamental right," 
he asserted.175 Therefore, an infringement of that right "triggers strict 
scrutiny under the compelling State interest and least restrictive 
means test."176 For this reason, in order to take a life by statute, the 
state must show that "such action is the least restrictive means" to 
achieve a "compelling government end."177 Chief Justice Tauro then 
171 0 'Neall, 327 N .E.2d at 665. 
172Id. 
mId. 
174 Id. at 667 n.5. 
17SId. at 668. 
176 O'Neall, 327 N.E.2d at 668. 
177Id. 
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ordered the Commonwealth and O'Neal to respond to the court's 
argument in thirty daysP8 
Justices Wilkins, Hennessey, and Kaplan concurred with the 
Chief Justice, but Justices Reardon, Quirico, and Braucher dissented. 
Wilkins and Kaplan were dubious about Chief Justice Tauro's due 
process-compelling state interest argument, but they agreed with the 
need for additional argument. Wilkins urged that "particular atten-
tion should be paid to art. 26."179 Mter noting the Supreme Court's 
decision to view the Eighth Amendment based upon "evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," he 
then suggested that the "appropriate standards applicable in the 
Commonwealth may be higher under art. 26 than the standards ap-
plicable under the Eighth Amendment. "180 Without foreclosing the 
validity of either Chief Justice Tauro or Justice Wilkins' position, Jus-
tice Hennessey invited a wide-ranging argument, including the idea 
that "new standards of compassion have made the death penalty un-
constitutional. "181 
The Commonwealth's supplemental brief, signed by the district 
attorneys of Suffolk, Middlesex, and Bristol counties, argued that 
capital punishment was a deterrent to rape-murder and that the state 
had a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from this heinous 
offense. First, the Commonwealth argued that life imprisonment was 
an insufficient punishment to deter a rape-murderer. In fact, absent 
the death penalty there would be an incentive for the rapist to mur-
der his victim in order to improve his chances of "escaping apprehen-
sion while not substantially increasing his penalty if he were caught." 
To buttress this argument, the Commonwealth cited economist Isaac 
Ehrlich's 1975 study of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 
Using multiple regression analysis, Ehrlich concluded that one execu-
tion might have resulted in seven or eight fewer murders. Finally, the 
Commonwealth reminded the court of women's "desperate need" for 
protection and the people's call for capital punishment.182 
178 Id. at 667 n.5, 668. 
179Id. at 669 (Wilkins,]., concurring). 
18°Id. (Wilkins,]., concurring); Trop, 356 U.S. at 10l. 
181 O'Neal I, 327 N.E.2d at 670 (Hennessey,]., concurring). See generally Trop, 356 U.S. 
86. 
182 Commonwealth's Supplemental Brief at 6,8, 10, 35, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 
N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975) (O'Neal II) (on file at Massachusetts S]C Archives) (reiterating 
Ehrlich's argument that one execution "may" save lives); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect 
of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397,414 (1975). 
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Homans' supplemental brief asserted that "the punishment of 
death operates to preclude regular, predictable, evenhanded applica-
tion of capital punishment and there can be no compelling govern-
mental interest which cannot be served by means less drastic than the 
killing of an inevitably small number of convicted, incarcerated felony 
rape-murderers." Homans noted that in order to justify the infringe-
ment upon the fundamental right of life the government must show 
the death penalty was "necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest" and that death is "precisely tailored" to achieve this 
interest. Homans conceded that some murderers might be deterred 
by the death penalty, but since the overwhelming majority of crimes 
committed were not the result of rational choice, death was not a de-
terrent. Finally, Homans concluded that life imprisonment for rape-
murder would properly satisfy the community'S need for safety and 
justice .183 
The SJC, three days before Christmas, 1975, found the state's 
mandatory death sentence for murder committed in the course of a 
rape or attempted rape unconstitutional in ONealILl84 In his concur-
ring opinion, Chief Justice Tauro broadly hinted that no death pen-
alty statute would pass constitutional muster. He relied primarily on 
the Massachusetts Constitution, letting his Fourteenth Amendment 
argument slip into a footnote. He focused on the question of whether 
capital punishment was cruel or unusual punishment, because he 
wanted to resolve the question of the "constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment under the cruel or unusual test."185 The Chief Justice merged 
two state constitutional strands, a due process argument based on Ar-
ticles 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and an 
analysis of Article 26's prohibition against cruel or unusual punish-
ment. I86 
Chief Justice Tauro rejected the state's argument that capital 
punishment was a better deterrent to murder than life imprisonment. 
He noted that two special commissions of the Massachusetts legisla-
ture and virtually every contemporary criminologist had concluded 
183 Defendant's Supplemental Brief, 2, 12, 20, 28, Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 
N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975) (O'Neal/I) (on file at Massachusetts SJC Archives). 
184 See generally 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975). The paragraph-long majority opinion of 
the court was followed by concurring opinions from each of the majority members: Tauro, 
Hennessey, Wilkins, Kaplan, and Braucher (who concurred only in the result of the court); 
Justices Reardon and Quirico dissented. See id. at 677. 
185 Id. at 679 n.3 (Tauro, CJ., concurring). 
186 Id. at 677 n.1, 679 n.3, 677 (Tauro, CJ., concurring). 
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that capital punishment does not deter murder. Chief Justice Tauro 
explained that studies comparing homicide rates in states without 
capital punishment to similar contiguous states with the ultimate pen-
alty indicated that homicide rates "are conditioned by other factors 
than the death penalty." He further noted that scientific studies also 
indicate that a mandatory death penalty was not a greater deterrent 
to homicide than discretionary use of capital punishment. "My review 
of the available studies," Chief Justice Tauro stated, "reveals no firm 
indication that capital punishment acts as a superior deterrent to 
homicide than other available punishments. "187 Therefore, the Com-
monwealth had not demonstrated that its compelling interest in de-
terrence could not adequately be served by other less restrictive 
means of punishment, nor did it demonstrate that the need to hold 
together the "social compact" required serious crimes to be punished 
by death.188 
Based on these arguments, the Chief Justice concluded the 
Commonwealth had not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that 
in pursuing its compelling interest of protecting citizens from rape-
murder, it had chosen means that did not "unnecessarily impinge on 
the fundamental constitutional right to life. "189 For this reason, the 
mandatory death penalty for murder committed in the course of rape 
violated the due process clause and the cruel or unusual punishment 
clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. In footnote twenty-three, 
Chief Justice Tauro planted a time bomb. The footnote extended the 
analysis beyond murder-rape.190 The footnote indicated that any new 
statutes authorizing the death penalty must meet the "compelling 
State interest" test.191 Justices Hennessey and Wilkins, in their concur-
ring opinions, stressed Massachusetts' "unique" past and recent death 
penalty history and the importance of Article 26.192 
His argument completed, the Chief Justice lashed out at Justices 
Braucher and Reardon for disagreeing with him. Given that Tauro 
retired before the end of the court's session, perhaps the attack was a 
parting shot in a long festering quarrel. Perhaps he heightened his 
rhetoric because of the importance of the death penalty issue. What-
ever the reason, his verbal assault on two men with whom he had 
187 [d. at 685 (Tauro, Cl, concurring). 
188 [d. at 685,687,682-86 (Tauro, Cl, concurring). 
189 O'Neal II, 339 N.E.2d at 688 (Tauro, Cl, concurring). 
190 [d. at 688 n.23 (Tauro, CJ., concurring). 
191 [d. (Tauro, Cl, concurring). 
192 [d. at 688 n.23, 688 (Tauro, CJ., concurring). 
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served nearly his entire tenure on the bench was personal and gratui-
tous. He accused Braucher of trying to avoid the important constitu-
tional issues by resorting to "doubtful" and "strained" statutory con-
struction and of violating his constitutional obligation as ajudge. The 
Chief Justice next savaged Reardon's "novel suggestion" that the SJC 
"refrain from construction and application of our State Constitution" 
and wait for the Supreme Court to offer guidance.I93 Reardon's point 
was ''l,ltterly without merit," declared Tauro. He added that the SJC, 
"not the Federal courts-bears ultimate responsibility for construc-
tion of our State Constitution." Tauro further expounded that "[o]ur 
interpretation of the State Constitution is final and cannot be chal-
lenged in the Federal courts."194 Finally, Tauro fired back at the 
charge that he allowed his personal views rather than the law to shape 
his opinion. On the contrary, Tauro retorted, he was motivated by the 
need to uphold the Constitution and to maintain the SJC's "inde-
pendence and impartiality. "195 
Overlooking Tauro's jabs, Governor Dukakis hailed the majority 
decision as "the crowning achievement of his judicial career" and a 
"brilliant work of exposition." In an editorial headlined Ending the 
Death Penalty, the Globe sang the praises of an evolving constitution. 
"Standards of human justice have changed-for the better, we think-
and both [the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Con-
stitution] were intended to serve more as general guides than as hard 
and fast rules." The SJC's second O'Neal decision, concluded the 
Globe, brought the law into conformity with contemporary Massachu-
setts' values.196 The Globe's assessment of popular beliefs about the 
constitutionality of the death penalty was far too optimistic. In fact, 
although Massachusetts' citizens were somewhat more ambivalent 
than Americans generally, a 1974 Gallop Poll showed roughly two-
thirds of all Americans favored the death penalty for murder.I97 Over 
the next decade the Massachusetts House reflected this sentiment by 
voting for new death penalty laws by wide margins. 
19~ [d. at 690 (Tauro, CJ" concurring). 
194 O'Neal II, 339 N.E.2d at 690 (Tauro, CJ" concurring). 
195 [d. (Tauro, CJ" concurring). 
196 BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 1975; BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1975. 
197 HAROLD STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
30 (1992). 
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C. The ~C Drives the Final Nail 
The celebration over O'Neal II was short-lived. In 1976, the Su-
preme Court in Gregg held that the new Georgia death sentencing 
statute was constitutionally permissible, opening the door for states 
across the country to craft similar statutes.198 In the wake of the Su-
preme Court's decision, the Massachusetts legislature asked the SJC 
for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed death 
penalty bill. Shaped by the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg, the 
Massachusetts bill provided for two phases: A jury would first deter-
mine a defendant's guilt or innocence; if found guilty, the jury would 
then vote separately on punishment.l99 To arrive at a sentence, the 
jury would take into account mitigating as well as aggravating circum-
stances, and the SJC would automatically review all death sentences. 
In its advisory opinion, the SJC told the legislature that its view of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty had not changed since O'NealIL 
The House bill might meet the standard set by the Supreme Court, 
but "it does not meet the O'Neal objection, namely, that capital pun-
ishment"200 violated Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights.201 The 
state also failed to show the death penalty'S "peculiar efficacy in com-
parison with other punishment. "202 In short, the SJC held firm to its 
state constitutional analysis.20!l 
A deepening fiscal crisis and an increasingly loud clamor for re-
instating the death penalty led to Dukakis' defeat in the 1978 Demo-
cratic primary by his conservative Democrat rival EdwardJ. King. The 
legislature quickly passed a new death penalty bill, Governor King 
signed it in the winter of 1980, and Newman Flanagan, the Suffolk 
County District Attorney, immediately forced a test of the law's consti-
tutionality. Flanagan announced he would seek the imposition of the 
death penalty for James Watson, an African-American teenager ac-
cused of the shooting death of a white Boston cab driver.204 
198 See generally Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
199 See id. at 153, 160-61. 
200 Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 364 N.E.2d 184, 188 
(1977). 
201 [d. at 186. 
202 [d. at 188. 
203 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153, 160-61, 186, 188; opinion of the Justices, 364 N.E.2d at 186, 
188. The opinion was signed by five of the SJC's seven justices. See id. 
204 1979 Mass. Acts 488; Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 
1975,1977-78 (Mass. 1980). For details about the 1978 electoral contest between Dukakis 
and King, see RICHARD GAINES & MICHAEL SEGAL, DUKAKIS AND THE REFORM IMPULSE 
157-63 (1987). 
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In the 1980 case of District Attorney v. Watson, the SJC concluded 
the new death penalty statute violated Article 26. Chief Justice Hen-
nessey bolstered the SJC's state constitutional argument with two ex-
amples. Chief Justice Hennessey, writing for the majority, first noted 
that, "what a society does in actuality is a much more compelling indi-
cator of the acceptability of the death penalty than the responses citi-
zens may give upon questioning. "205 The Chief Justice noted that no 
one had been executed in Massachusetts since 1947 and then argued 
that the lack of executions spoke much louder than opinion polls and 
passionate rhetoric.206 Successive governors "who bore the responsibil-
ity for administering the death penalty," found it "unacceptable. "207 
Second, Chief Justice Hennessey wrote that "it is the inevitable that 
the death penalty will be applied arbitrarily ... [and] will fall dis-
criminatorily upon minorities, particularly black" persons.208 The 
Chief Justice noted that data on death sentences imposed in Florida, 
Georgia, Texas, and Ohio under statutes upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1976 made this argument abundantly clear.209 Moreover, 
Chief Justice Hennessey pointedly added, "the existence of racial 
prejudice in some persons in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a 
fact of which we take notice."210 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Paul J. Liacos, who Governor 
Dukakis appointed to the court in 1976 and who once described the 
death penalty as "torture in the guise of civilized business," passion-
ately amplified the court's reasons for finding the death penalty 
"impermissibly cruel when judged by contemporary standards of de-
cency."211 Justice Liacos wrote movingly of how the imposition of the 
death penalty was "disguised by the language and technique of ab-
straction," how a "ritual language, reduced to stereotyped phrases" 
masked our shame and the "degrading" business of deliberately put-
ting someone to death.212 Indeed, the clear purpose of the prohibi-
tion against cruel or unusual punishment, Justice Liacos argued, "is to 
guarantee a measure of human dignity even to the wrongdoers of our 
society" and to preserve the dignity of government. Capital punish-
205 Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1282. 
206 [d. 
207 [d. 
208 [d. at 1283. 
209 [d. at 1285-86. 
210 Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1282, 1283, 1285-86. 
211 [d. at 1289 (Liacos,j., concurring). 
212 [d. at 1289-90 (Liacos,j., concurring). 
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ment, Justice Liacos concluded, was "antithetical to the spiritual free-
dom that underlies the democratic mind. "213 
In 1984 the SJC confronted another capital punishment statute 
and again found it unconstitutional. This time the court could not 
rely upon Article 26. On November 2, 1982, Massachusetts' voters gut-
ted Watson by adding the following language to Article 26: 
No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be con-
strued as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of 
death. The general court may, for the purpose of protecting 
the general welfare of the citizens, authorize the imposition 
of the punishment of death by the courts of law having juris-
diction of crimes subject to the punishment of death. 214 
On the heels of that constitutional amendment, the legislature 
adopted a new statute allowing juries to apply the death penalty in 
certain first-degree murder cases. Governor King, a lame duck after 
losing to Dukakis in the 1982 gubernatorial race, signed the bill into 
law. Two months later, three assailants shot and killed State Trooper 
George L. Hanna during a routine traffic stop. At pretrial hearings, 
the Commonwealth asked that the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty statute be ruled upon before the case went to trial.215 
Speaking for a slim four to three majority in Colon-Cruz., Justice 
Liacos acknowledged that the amendment "now prevents this court 
from construing any provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, in-
cluding art. 26 itself, as forbidding the imposition of the punishment 
of death. "216 But Justice Liacos quickly added: "We do not, however, 
see anything in the new language of art. 26 which prevents us from 
invalidating a particular death penalty statute under the Massachu-
setts Constitution on a ground other than that the imposition of the 
punishment of death is forbidden."217 In fact, the SJC found the 1982 
death penalty statute violated Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights, 
because it provided that only those defendants who pleaded not guilty 
and demanded a jury trial were at risk of being put to death. Those 
who pleaded guilty could avoid the death penalty. "The inevitable 
consequence," wrote Justice Liacos, "is that defendants are discour-
213Id. at 1289, 1289-90, 1294 (Liacos,J., concurring); BOSTON GLOBE, May 8,1999. 
214 MAss. CONST. Part J, art. 26; Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 118 
(Mass. 1984). 
215 Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d at 118. 
216 Id. at 121. 
217Id. 
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aged from asserting their right not to plead guilty and their right to 
demand a trial by jury." The SJC's opinion ended legal controversy 
over the death penalty in Massachusetts. 218 
CONCLUSION 
The executions of Sacco and Vanzetti spurred a young Jewish 
woman to work to reverse a centuries-old tradition of state-sanctioned 
vengeance. For the next forty years, in the face of repeated disap-
pointments, Ehrmann reasoned with the proponents of capital pun-
ishment. With carefully collected and analyzed data buttressing her 
belief that Massachusetts gained nothing and lost a great deal by put-
ting convicted murderers to death, she fought for abolition of the 
death penalty. When she and the MCADP achieved partial success in 
1951, others with less dedication counseled a respite, even retirement. 
However, Ehrmann was no fonder of inactivity than she was of injus-
tice; she kept the faith. At the same time, a unique succession of gov-
ernors-some with noble motives, others driven by political oppor-
tunism-refused to execute condemned men waiting on death row. 
When the law took center stage in the latter part of the struggle, three 
remarkable justices led the SJC to assert a commitment to the protec-
tions of life rooted in the Massachusetts Constitution. 
The perseverance, commitment, and courage of a dozen women 
and men ended the use of capital punishment in Massachusetts. More 
than a half-century has passed since that spring day in 1947 when 
Massachusetts quietly executed Bellino and Gertson, and nearly two 
decades have passed since the SJC last deliberated the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty. Spurred by a brutal murder, the public's fear 
of violence, or a politician's opportunism, the debate has raged anew 
nearly every year since 1984.219 For the moment, Massachusetts holds 
true to the belief that a civilized people will not tolerate the state put-
ting a human being to death. The issue, however, remains volatile, 
and the struggle is not over. 
218 [d. at 121, 124, 128. Chief Justice Hennessey cited United States v. jackson, 390 U.S. 
570, 581 (1968), in which the Court found a similar statute unconstitutional. [d. at 130 
(Hennessey, CJ., concurring). 
219 Following the murder of ten-year-oldJeffrey Curley in October 1997, acting Gover-
nor Paul Cellucci sought to have the death penalty reinstated, but the bill was defeated in 
the House by a single vote. BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 1997; BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1997. 

